Thursday, October 6, 2016

Deutsche Bank: A Greek Tragedy at a German Institution?

This may be a stereotype, but the Germans are a precise people and while that precision often gets in the way of more creative pursuits (like cooking and valuation), it lends itself well to engineering and banking. For decades until the introduction of the Euro and the creation of the European Central Bank, there was no central bank in the world that matched the Bundesbank for solidity and reliability. Thus, investors and regulators around the world, I am sure, are looking at the travails of Deutsche Bank in the last few weeksand wondering how the world got turned upside down. I am sure that there are quite a few institutions in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy who are secretly enjoying watching a German entity be at the center of a market crisis. Talk about schadenfreude!

Deutsche Bank's Journey to Banking Hell
There are others who have told the story about how Deutsche Bank got into the troubles it is in, much more creatively and more fully than I will be able to do so. Consequently, I will stick with the numbers and start by tracing Deutsche Bank’s net income over the last 28 years, in conjunction with the return on equity generated each year.

If Deutsche Bank was reluctant to follow more daring competitors into risky businesses for much of the last century, it threw caution to the winds in the early part of the last decade, as it grew its investment banking and trading businesses and was rewarded handsomely with higher earnings from 2000 to 2007. Like almost every other bank on earth, the crisis in 2008 had a devastating impact on earnings at Deutsche, but the bank seemed to be on a recovery path in 2009, before it relapsed. Some of its recent problems reflect Deutsche’s well chronicled pain in investment banking, some come from its exposure to the EU problem zone (Greece, Spain, Portugal) and some from slow growth in the European economy. Whatever the reasons, in 2014 and 2015, Deutsche reported cumulative losses of close to $16 billion, leading to a management change, with a promise that things would turn around under new management. The other dimension where this crisis unfolded was in Deutsche’s regulatory capital, and as that number dropped in 2015, Deutsche Bank's troubles moved front and center. This is best seen in the graph below of regulatory capital (Tier 1 Capital) from 1998 to 2015, with the ratio of the Tier 1 capital to risk adjusted assets each year super imposed on the graph. 

The ratio of regulatory capital to risk adjusted assets at the end of 2015 was 14.65%, lower than it was in 2014, but much higher than capital ratios in the pre-2008 time-period. That said, with the tightening of regulatory capital constraints after the crisis, Deutsche was already viewed as being under-capitalized in late 2015, relative to other large banks early this year. The tipping point for the current crisis came from the decision by the US Department of Justice to levy a $14 billion fine on Deutsche Bank for transgressions related to the pricing of mortgage backed securities a decade ago. As rumors swirled in the last few weeks, Deutsche Bank found itself in the midst of a storm, since the perception that a bank is in trouble often precipitates more trouble, as rumors replace facts and regulators panic. The market has, not surprisingly, reacted to these stories by marking up the default risk in the bank and marking down the stock price, most strikingly over the last two weeks, but also over a much longer period. 

At close of trading on October 4, 2016, the stock was trading at $13.33 as share, yielding a market capitalization of $17.99 billion, down more than 80% from its pre-2008 levels and 50% from 2012 levels. Reflecting more immediate fears of default, the Deutsche CDS and CoCo bonds also have dropped in price, and not surprisingly, hedge funds sensing weakness have moved in to short the stock. 

Revaluing Deutsche Bank
When a stock is down more than 50% over a year, as Deutsche is, it is often irresistible to many contrarian investors, but knee jerk contrarian investing, i.e., investing in a stock just because it has dropped a lot, is a dangerous strategy. While it is true that Deutsche Banks has lost a large portion of its market capitalization in the last five years, it is also true that the fundamentals for the company have deteriorated, with lower earnings and hits to regulatory capital. To make an assessment of whether Deutsche is now “cheap”, you have to revalue the company with these new realities built in, to see if the market has over reacted, under reacted or reacted correctly to the news. (I will do the entire valuation in US dollars, simply for convenience, and it is straightforward to redo the entire analysis in Euros, if that is your preferred currency).

a. Profitability 
As you can see from the graph of Deutsche’s profits and return on equity, the last twelve months have delivered blow after blow to the company, but that drop has been a long time coming. The bank has had trouble finding a pathway to make sustainable profits, as it is torn between the desire of some at the bank to return to its commercial banking roots and the push by others to explore the more profitable aspects of trading and investment banking. The questions in valuation are not only about whether profits will bounce back but also what they will bounce back to. To make this judgment, I computed the returns on equity of all publicly traded banks globally and the distribution is below: 
Global Bank Data
I will assume that given the headwinds that Deutsche faces, it will not be able to improve its returns on equity to the industry median or even its own cost of equity in the near term. I will target a return on equity of 5.85%, at the 25th percentile of all banks, as Deutsche’s return on equity in year 5, and assume that the bank will be able to claw back to earning its cost of equity of 9.44% (see risk section below) in year 10. The estimated return on equity, with my estimates of common equity each year (see section of regulatory capital) deliver the following projected net income numbers. 
YearCommon EquityROEExpected Net Income
Base$64,609 -13.70%$(8,851)
1$71,161 -7.18%$(5,111)
2$72,754 -2.84%$(2,065)
3$74,372 0.06%$43
4$76,017 1.99%$1,512
5$77,688 5.85%$4,545
6$79,386 6.57%$5,214
7$81,111 7.29%$5,910
8$82,864 8.00%$6,632
9$84,644 8.72%$7,383
10$86,453 9.44%$8,161
Terminal Year$87,326 9.44%$8,244
I am assuming that the path back to profitability will be rocky, with losses expected for the next two years, before the company is able to turn its operations around. Note also that these expected losses are in addition to the $10 billion fine that I have estimated for the DOJ.

b. Regulatory Capital 
Deutsche Bank’s has seen a drop in it Tier 1 capital ratios over time but it now faces the possibility of being further reduced as Deutsche Bank will have to draw on it to pay the US DOJ government fine. While the DOJ has asserted a fine of $14 billion, Deutsche will negotiate to reduce it to a lower number and it is assessing its expected payment to be closer to $6 billion. I have assumed a total capital drop of $ 10 billion, leaving me with and adjusted regulatory capital of $55.28 billion and a Tier 1 capital ratio of 12.41%. Over the next few years, the bank will come under pressure from both regulators and investors to increase its capitalization, but to what level? To make that judgment, I look at Tier 1 capital ratios across all publicly traded banks globally: 
Global Bank Data
I will assume that Deutsche Bank will try to increase its regulatory capital ratio to the average (13.74%) by next year and then push on towards the 75th percentile value of 15.67%. As the capital ratio grows, the firm will have to increase regulatory capital over the next few years and that can be seen in the table below: 

YearNet IncomeRisk-Adjusted AssetsTier 1 Capital/ Risk Adjusted AssetsTier 1 CapitalChange in Tier 1 CapitalFCFE = Net Income - Change in Tier 1
Base$(8,851)$445,570 12.41%$55,282
1$(5,111)$450,026 13.74%$61,834 $6,552 $(11,663)
2$(2,065)$454,526 13.95%$63,427 $1,593 $(3,658)
3$43 $459,071 14.17%$65,045 $1,619 $(1,576)
4$1,512 $463,662 14.38%$66,690 $1,645 $(133)
5$4,545 $468,299 14.60%$68,361 $1,671 $2,874
6$5,214 $472,982 14.81%$70,059 $1,698 $3,516
7$5,910 $477,711 15.03%$71,784 $1,725 $4,185
8$6,632 $482,488 15.24%$73,537 $1,753 $4,880
9$7,383 $487,313 15.46%$75,317 $1,780 $5,602
10$8,161 $492,186 15.67%$77,126 $1,809 $6,352
Terminal Year$8,244 $497,108 15.67%$77,897 $771 $7,472
The negative free cash flows to equity in the first three years will have to be covered with new capital that meets the Tier 1 capital criteria. By incorporating these negative free cash flows to equity in my valuation, I am in effect reducing my value per share today for future dilution, a point that I made in a different context when talking about cash burn

c. Risk
Rather than follow the well-trodden path of using risk free rates, betas and risk premiums, I am going to adopt a short cut that you can think of as a model-agnostic way of computing the cost of equity for a sector. To illustrate the process, consider the median bank in October 2016, trading at a price to book ratio of 1.06 and generating a return on equity of 9.91%. Since the median bank is likely to be mature, I will use a stable growth model to derive its price to book ratio: 
Plugging in the median bank’s numbers into this equation and using a nominal growth rate set equal to the risk free rate of 1.60% (in US dollars), I estimate a US $ cost of equity for the median bank to be 9.44% in 2016. 

Using the same approach, I arrive at estimates of 7.76% for the banks that are at the 25th percentile of risk and 10.20% for banks at the 75th percentile.  In valuing Deutsche Bank, I will start the valuation by assuming that the bank is at the 75th percentile of all banks in terms of risk and give it a cost of equity of 10.20%. As the bank finds its legs on profitability and improves its regulatory capital levels, I will assume that the cost of equity moves to the median of 9.44%. 

The Valuation 
Starting with net income from part a, adjusting for reinvestment in the form of regulatory capital in part b and adjusting for risk in part c, we obtain the following table of numbers for Deutsche Bank. 

YearFCFETerminal ValueCost of equity Cumulative Cost of EquityPV
5$2,874 10.20%1.6252$1,768.16
6$3,516 10.05%1.7885$1,965.99
7$4,185 9.90%1.9655$2,129.10
8$4,880 9.74%2.1570$2,262.34
9$5,602 9.59%2.3639$2,369.91
10$6,352 $87,317 9.44%2.5871$36,206.88
Total value of equity $31,838.74
Value per share =$22.97
Note that the big number as the terminal value in year 10 reflects the expectation that Deutsche will grow at the inflation rate (1% in US dollar terms) in perpetuity while earning its cost of equity. Note also that since the cost of equity is expected to change over time, the cumulated cost of equity has to be computed as the discount factor. The discounted present value of the cash flows is $31.84 billion, which when divided by the number of shares (1,386 million) yields a value of $22.97 per share. There is one final adjustment that I will make and it reflects the special peril that banks face, when in crisis mode. There is the possibility that the perception that the bank is in trouble could make it impossible to function normally and that the government will have to step in to bail it out (since the option of letting it default is not on the table). I may be over optimistic but I attach only a 10% chance to this occurring and assume that my equity will be completely wiped out, if it occurs. My adjusted value is: 
Expected Value per share = $22.97(.9) + $0.00 (.1) = $20.67 
Given my many assumptions, the value per share that I get for Deutsche Bank is $20.67. To illustrate how much the regulatory capital shortfall (and the resulting equity issues/dilution) and overhang of a catastrophic loss affect this value, I have deconstructed the value per share into its constituent effects: 

Unadjusted Equity Value =$33.63
- Dilution Effect from new equity issues$(10.66)
- Expected cost of equity wipeout$(2.30)
Value of equity per share today =$20.67

Note that the dilution effect, captured by taking the present value of the negative FCFE in the first four years, reduces the value of equity by 31.69% and the possibility of a catastrophic loss of equity lowers the value another 6.83%. The entire valuation is pictured below:
Download Spreadsheet
I know that you will disagree with some or perhaps all of my assumptions. To accommodate those differences, I have set up my valuation spreadsheet to allow for you to replace my assumptions with yours. If you are so inclined, please do enter your numbers into the shared Google spreadsheet that I have created for this purpose and let's get a crowd valuation going!

Time for action or Excuse for inaction? 
At the current stock price of $13.33 (at close of trading on October 4), the stock looks undervalued by about 36%, given my estimated value, and I did buy the stock at the start of trading yesterday. Like everyone else in the market, I am uncertain, but waiting for the uncertainty to resolve itself is not a winning strategy. Either the uncertainty will be resolved (in good or bad ways) and everyone will have clarity on what Deutsche is worth, and the price and value will adjust, or the uncertainty will not resolve itself in the near future and you will be sitting on the side lines. For those of you who have been reading my blog over time, you know that I have played this game before, with mixed results. My bets on JP Morgan (after its massive trading loss in 2012) and Volkswagen (after the emissions scandal) paid off well but my investment in Valeant (after its multiple scandals) has lost me 15% so far (but I am still holding and hoping). I am hoping that my Deutsche Bank investment does better, but I strapped in for a rocky ride!

YouTube Videos


  1. My valuation of Deutsche Bank
  2. Global Banks - Data
  3. Google Shared Spreadsheet: Crowd Valuation of Deutsche Bank


Unknown said...

Very interesting post. However I must say that I am apslute beginner in the field of valuation and finance. So my question is what is motivation behind valuation and generally speaking finance. More precaislly speaking why should people love valuation and finance. By the way I am starting to use your book of valuation.

Best regards,

Anonymous said...

The fine from the DOJ is not the only fine waiting to be settled. Russia will also fine Deutsche probably in the area of 5 billion USD. Is that in the valuation? Also there are limits to how much capital Deutsche can raise without further approval from their shareholders and I guess the uncertainty surrounding how much capital they will need = how much the shares will be diluted, means that they will settle deals with the DOJ before raising new capital? Also to the point of topline; for the moments it seems that clients are withdrawing from their relationship with Deutsche as they are worried, that might in return have topline effects, further lowering net income.

Matthias Frey said...

Dear Professor,

Thank you for your interesting post.

Concerning the 10% probability of an equity wipe out that you incorporated, isn't this risk already taken into account in the cost of equity that you used?

Best regards,

Tim said...

Dear Prof. Damodaran,

Could you please inform us on the source your data on 616 global banks is based on? The file you provide seems to be a compiled report download.

Kind regards,


Unknown said...


Can you walk through your thinking around applying global industry-average return rates for DB -- especially at the critical terminal value -- in light of:

- the fact that DB has often not achieved even 5.85% over the past two decades, let alone 9.44%,
- the fact that when the bank has delivered attractive ROEs, it's typically been right before a crash and therefore the result of either unsustainable forces or high risk taking (notably right before the dotcom bubble and the financial crisis),
- the fact that higher rates of regulatory capital will make it that much harder to earn higher rates of return and the assumption of increasing regulatory capital will act as a headwind, and
- the nature of the German home banking market, where competition from co-op type savings institutions makes competition a bit insane and even more difficult to earn high rates of return on the traditional banking services.

You may have better data than me, but it looks like a straight average of DB's last 20 years of ROE is around 6% (median is lower).


Aswath Damodaran said...

1. The source for the raw data is S&P Capital IQ.
2. There may be other fines that are levied on DBk but I have tried to be conservative. I set aside $10 billion to cover the fines, even though DBk has already set aside $5 billion last year to cover exactly that contingency. There are other governments that may be tempted to step in and levy their own fines.
3. On the final return on equity number, I am effectively assuming that banking will revert at least to being a sustaining business (where you earn your cost). If, as you argue, DBk will earn less than its cost of equity in perpetuity, that would be a damning indictment of the business and perhaps an argument that banks will cease to exist.
4. The discount rate is not a good vehicle for showing truncation risk (like the risk of a equity wipeout or nationalization). It is better suited for going concern risks.

Tim said...

Dear Prof. Damodaran,

I have looked at your spreadsheet and believe I have found some miscalculations:

1) Even though you mention in the text you used 4 years, when discussing the equity value decomposition to compute dilution effect, you select 3 years (instead of 4) ; in a similar fashion unadjusted equity value is computed;
2) In adjusting the ROE for the first 5 years, the current ROE in the formula inside the brackets in NOT fixed; moreover, the divisor is 3 and not 5. This implies, that Year 1 ROE value is -9.79%, instead of -7.18%. This correction, drives the estimate value per share down to $17.65. Though my logic is based on linear adjustment of ROE to 5-year target ROE, there might be something I am missing in your approach and would appreciate if you could explain that.

Thank you very much for your insightful analyses and education you provide through this blog.

Kind regards,


Unknown said...

Trusting your smarts and analysis, I'm happy to take at least a small position in this if I know you'll let your readers know if you decide to sell. Will you do that--and for other positions you've covered and bought when they seemed unvalued at the time? Of course, I will not and would not blame you for losses--totally my responsibility, but given I'd be the discipline in this situation, will the "guru" let us know when a change has come?

alex said...

Hi Aswath.

I am your fan and love your classes and books.

As an valuation´s exercise, your DBk´s valution is wonderful. But I would not invest any penny on Deutched bank. The reason is that it has not a good administration. This is clear in the numbers.

I know you like invest where is dark, but you should avoid companies with bad administrations.

When you have valued Amazon for the first time, at that time it was a dark valuation, however Amazon always had good administration. Very different from the Deutch Bank.

I think you are risking a lot investing in bad managed companies.

Unknown said...

Hi Professor!

Great post, thx for sharing your thoughts on this interesting case.
Would appreciate if you could tackle a few questions:
1. Why did you decide to take current ROE and PBV, rather than cycle adjusting them by averaging over the last, say, 5y? Effectively, analysis implies mean reversion to today's numbers, rather to long-term (i.e. sustainable) values.
2. How did you factor in disruptions to the business due to the distress? RA assets are growing as if business as usual.
3. What does CDS spread imply about the default probability? Why did you use your estimate, instead of market's estimate?
4. Do you think DBk could experience limited access to capital?
5. Where is crystal ball???!!! You taught us not to look at a price unless it is associated with a clearly defined probability distribution (great Tesla/SolarCity post)!


Anonymous said...

Good work diving into the depths of the spreadsheet and some of your points are on the mark and some not so much.
1. You are right about my using the first 3 years. Those are the big capital deficit years. By year 4, I am pretty much at break even but technically I should have added that year on for dilution as well.
2. I am not taking five linear steps to get to 5.85% but using an adjustment factor of 1/3 of the distance each year to get to my end value. That is because the losses from last year were caused primarily by a set aside of $6 billion into a provision to cover the fine that has just been imposed on them. Assuming that they will continue to set aside provisions each year and fining them $10 billion would be over kill. You can adjust the 1/3 to 1/5 if you want but that assumes that DBk will have huge business losses (on top of the provisions) for the next 3 years and that seems to be too much (to me).

Anonymous said...

Hello Prof Damodaran,
BTW I am watching your YouTube Finance courses. Invaluable information.
Could you please talk about "off balance sheet item" of DB?.
It is being said that the biggest risk in DB resides in its gigantic Derivatives Book (10´s of Trillions).
Ref (Michael Lewitt).He is taking though the other side.

Anonymous said...

I cannot invest in DB just as i could not invest in TWTR. In the case of DB, there is no coherent strategy and instead the the Company is in lines of business that continue to underperform, not earning a WACC and to date there has been nothing the management has done to address substantial underlying business challenges. Bad business, bad management cannot be overcome via spreadsheet valuations.
Any estimate of value is only sensible if you think there is a management team in place to execute the vision embodied in your projection.

The same is true of TWTR. Many look to number of users, eyeballs and other only interesting metrics and take that in to account when projecting revenues from capture of digital advertising. The only problem is this: Advertisers who are increasingly questioning the digital spend have not to date seen TWTR as a compelling venue to advertise on. So, no amount of spreadsheet analysis will change that picture and it is unlikely that this shortcoming is due to ineffective management, but instead due to a sub par vehicle for advertisers.
It may have some value to someone, but that is a guess and bidders will be few.
The point is a spreadsheet cannot overcome a bad business or execution challenges that management to date has not been able make good on

Anonymous said...

Great post. I would hesitate to make this an actionable investment only because the total equity value you derived is less than the terminal value you used to derive it - $32B vs $36B!
Most of the value you see in DBk comes from where uncertainty is the highest - 10yrs+ into the future.

Anonymous said...

Thank you for a very informative post! As a general question regarding bank valuations - I am a little unclear on the proper regulatory capital to focus on. Should one use Common Equity Tier 1 capital or the broader Tier 1 capital (that includes other securities such as preferred stock). I would imagine that by using the Tier 1 capital ratio in the valuation, the issuance of preferred stock and payment of preferred dividends would affect the reinvestment in regulatory capital and hence the free cash flow to equity. The valuation would then need to account for the preferred stock to arrive at a common equity value. I would appreciate your feedback.

Anonymous said...

Thanks for this interesting and timely post.

I have a question on your model. In year 5 investment in regulatory capital is 1671 and FCFE 2874. The book equity only increases with the investment in regulatory capital.

Should the difference between the generated FCFE 2874 and what is invested in reg capital 1671 not be added to book equity as well if it is not paid out as a dividend? Or are you implicitly treating the FCFE as a dividend cash flow that is discounted back using COE?

In the latter case, would you agree with me that your model simply resembles a dividend discount model (FCFE representing dividend) where the drivers are ROE, COE and risk weight assets growth.

Thanks for your feedback.


Anonymous said...

Thanks for this interesting and timely post.

I have a question on your model. In year 5 investment in regulatory capital is 1671 and FCFE 2874. The book equity only increases with the investment in regulatory capital.

Should the difference between the generated FCFE 2874 and what is invested in reg capital 1671 not be added to book equity as well if it is not paid out as a dividend? Or are you implicitly treating the FCFE as a dividend cash flow that is discounted back using COE?

In the latter case, would you agree with me that your model simply resembles a dividend discount model (FCFE representing dividend) where the drivers are ROE, COE and risk weight assets growth.

Thanks for your feedback.


Aswath Damodaran said...

I think that you have the base model and the derivative model mixed up. You should always value equity by discounting FCFE at the cost of equity. That is the general model and that is what you should aspire to do. The dividend discount model is a very specific (and perhaps lazy) version of the FCFE model, where you are assuming that a bank pays out what it can afford to in dividends and never has a negative FCFE. That may have been okay assumptions pre -2008 but not any more.

Anonymous said...

I assume that while you look at FCFE for banks, you recognize that banks in the current regulatory environment will not be able to pay out anywhere near what FCFE might represent and while that number may be high and show a decent PV intrinsic value based on someones assumptions, it is hard to see how ever increasing retention of capital will allow banks to earn their cost of capital and i do think in calculating returns, regulatory capital must be taken in to account. So, and i have not looked at your model closely, at what point in time does DB earn at or above its Cost of Capital and if not for some time, does this not come up as a negative and make one thing that their underlying projection "back ends" the value and an awful lot has to happen to really believe that the execution can meet the spreadsheet projection?
Very good write-up

no name said...

Dear Prof.

Off-topic, just saw this on Bloomberg. Sanford Bernstein says DCF doesn't work in low int rate environment to value stocks ... I imagine you might have something to say about it? If so, would you kindly share it with us?


Here is the link:

Mahmoud Bekri said...

Many thanks for the inspiring publications prof. Domadoran.

I have a question about GDP linked bonds. How can we evaluate the Gdp premium? In a survey of the working of the bank of England, they mentioned the following:this should be between 1 and 1.5% ). How we can test this saying?
Many thanks dear prof!

Hugo Roque said...

Dear Professor Damodaran,

Thank you for your post.

I have a doubt on the valuation. You are assuming that the impact of the necessary capital increases is reflected on the computed cash flows. But the prices at which the capital increases occur will make the impact very different. Not making this adjustment is like assuming that the company will make the capital increases at the price of the calculated fair value. That is very unlikely. Another question is if they will give preference to actual shareholders or not in the processes. Its a big unknown and with different dilution consequences.

For example if the projected capital increase of 6,5 Bi USD in year one is done at 10 USD it will mean +655 million new shares. That will severely dilute expected future cash flows and the value of the bank.

This is the biggest risk for banks.

US banks like BAC and C are better capitalized and still trade at significant discount to book values. For those who expect banks to produce at least a return equal to their cost of equity they look like good bets.

Best regards,
Hugo Roque

Aswath Damodaran said...

That is a good point and it is true that I am implicitly assuming that Deutsche will be able to issue shares at the intrinsic value. I am not sure that this is the biggest risk in the valuation, but you could easily build in an alternate assumption. For instance, you can assume that the shares you will have to issue will be at a discount on intrinsic value, as long as you are willing to specify the discount and replace the negative cash flow effect on value per share with a share count effect. I am actually thinking of building a variant of this spreadsheet to see the effect on value.. Perhaps in another post..

Unknown said...

Dear Prof. Damodaran

Why do you ignore the currrent management's targets of achieving a return on tangible equity of 10% in 2017 (mainly by getting the cost base down to 22bio EUR from 29bio EUR)? Don't you consider those tatgets realistic or don't you trust Mr. Cryan and his team? Or don't you know about those targets because you just compared Deutsche with all the other banks without diving into the specifics? It is of course possible that the management team fails to deliver, but by 9 years? Furthermore, you forgot to correct the current equity for the sale of Deutsche Postbank, which will reduce it quite significantly.

Tom Low said...

Hi Professor,

In calculating the Book Equity in Row 6, you add the previous year's Book Equity by Investment in Regulatory Capital. Shouldn't it also increases (decreases) by net income (loss)?


Dr. Joachim Seifert said...

Dear Prof. Damadoran,

this is a nice analysis.

Given the currently announced capital increase - it would be very interesting to have that extension of your model that takes into account discounts to intrinsic value for share emissions.
Also some of the uncertainties have been resolved - making an update worthwhile

Yours sincerely