Showing posts with label Market Crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Market Crisis. Show all posts

Monday, November 9, 2026

The AI Trade Deconstructed: AI Builders, AI Suppliers and AI Product firms!

    When I posted my valuation of Anthropic a few days ago, I noted that turbulence lay ahead, both for the company and the market. I did not expect that turbulence to be this forceful and arrive this soon, but markets don't have an obligation to wait until it is convenient for investors, to adjust to new realities. With the election results on November 3 acting as a catalyst, investors initially responded positively with stocks up on Wednesday, but reversed course sharply on Thursday, with the NASDAQ down close to 6% and the S&P 500 declining 4%. This drop has again brought to the forefront questions about the AI trade and whether it has run its course. 

    In this post, I will start by referring to my earlier note on AI as a business, and use the ideas in it to deconstruct the many players that are lumped together as AI companies, from those spending the money building the data centers (hyperscalers) to the firms benefiting from selling the builders the ingredients for these data centers (chip makers, electrical equipment, power and even real estate) to the companies that are spending considerable amounts , leasing these data centers for long periods  (with the LLMs in the lead). I will argue that while all of these groups benefit, at least in general, from AI's success at creating large and profitable markets, we are at a point in the AI disruption, where their interests and payoffs will diverge, with implications for both the businesses and investors. I use last week's market carnage in technology and examine how the market treatment of these different groups may be a reflection of a more discerning market, less willing to mark up and mark down all AI companies, and more likely to treat them differently, as their business interests diverge.

The AI Transition 

    My journey on AI started with a selfish and narrow intent, which was to evaluate an investment I had made in Nvidia in 2018, for reasons entirely unrelated to AI. I thought that Nvidia, at the time, was a innovative chip company with more pricing power than many in its peer group, and felt that it was undervalued, given its prospects. While the stock outperformed my portfolio early on, it was the ChatGPT debut on November 30, 2022, and the subsequent AI buzz that put its stock price on steroids. That left me with a challenge, albeit a welcome one, of deciding whether I should continue to hold on to a stock that had already become a twenty-bagger or sell some or all of it. Since much of Nvidia's supersized success was being propelled by AI demand, that required me to take my first look at how big the AI market would be, and how well Nvidia was positioned to take advantage of that market. If you have read my multiple posts on Nvidia over the last three years, you may be aware that I sold all my shares in the company in four installments, with the last sale happening earlier this year. As many of you have been quick to point out, my decision to gradually decrease my Nvidia position has led me to leave money on the table, but I have no regrets. 

The Players

    In the process of trying to understand AI and disentangle the many players in the AI space. I break them down broadly into four groups:

  1. AI Suppliers: While AI is viewed as a technology business, we have learned over the last few years that it is much more capital intensive than any other tech endeavor in history. The data centers and infrastructure that are needed to power AI agents and models has created a surge in demand for ingredients. The biggest portion of the cost, at least so far, has been on high-powered  chips, with Nvidia claiming a lion's share, and enough left over demand for other chip companies to benefit. This infrastructure build out has increased demand for electrical equipment, with power and real estate companies also gaining as data centers get built.
  2. AI Builders: Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft, four companies that were part of FANGAM, the acronym that predates the Mag Seven, bought into the AI hope, and joined by a handful of other players (Oracle, Coreweave), they have invested hundreds of billions of dollars into AI cap ex (data centers and infrastructure). The market cut these hyperscalers slack early on, rewarding them for their capital spending, even though that spending was denting profitability at these companies and demolishing cash flows, and part of the AI trade question has been whether the market is running out of patience, waiting for payoff.
  3. AI Products: In the last two years, companies which are on the frontlines of creating AI products and services, have became the focal point of investors, albeit in the private investing world, with talk of public offerings pricing them in the trillions of dollars. SpaceX became the first of these to list, but Anthropic's IPO is imminent and OpenAI will join, sooner rather than later. There are  other companies (Palantir is the most prominent), albeit only a handful, that are  have made AI a central component of the products and services they sell, but that number will be added to, as private businesses in the space go public.
  4. AI Customers: There is a fourth group, perhaps more critical than any of the above, that will determine the value creation potential and long-term standing of this business, and that includes all of the potential customers, individual as well as businesses, for AI products and services. While the premise for AI hype is that its reach (both in terms of numbers and monetization) will be huge, it is undeniable, even if you are an AI diehard, that there is little of substance to show at the moment. Even if you take the ARR numbers that are being leaked by the lead players, the collective revenues from AI products and services right now is about $250 billion, a small number relative to what has been invested in the space. The entire AI ecosystem is built on the premise that this group will become much larger, both in terms of reach across businesses and money spent in the trillions of dollars.
The companies in all of these groups can be classified as being in the AI business, but they generate value in very different ways from that business.

The Linkages

  There are links that hold these groups together, and I have tried to capture those linkages and how they play out as revenues, expenses and earnings in each group:

This simple, and perhaps even over-simplistic, breakdown of AI does, in my view, provide a good starting point for understanding why their interests and market pricing is more likely to diverge in the future, as the business takes form.  The linkages between the AI groups come from three core transactions between these groups that determine not just their current earnings but also their long term value propositions:

  1. Building the AI infrastructure: The  AI builders are spending the money building the infrastructure and much of it is being legitimately classified as capital expenditures, though there is a discussion to be had about the life of that infrastructure. The reason that the investment life matters is that it determines the amortization schedule for the AI cap ex, and consequently the negative impact on earnings in the current year; the free cashflows  are lower since they take a direct hit from the cap ex. The suppliers report these same capital expenditures as revenues in the current year, and when netted out against their operating costs, increase earnings at these companies. I wrote about how the net effect of the infrastructure buildout has been an increase in aggregate earnings at US companies in the last year, and has supported stock prices, even as interest rates have soared.
  2. Leasing the AI infrastructure: The AI architecture, once built, is leased out by the builders to the businesses that use the data centers to create and support the products and services they offer. The builders report the lease payments as revenues, allowing them to earn a return back on their infrastructure build, but for the AI product and service businesses, these payments are either operating expenses, if annually reset, or financial expenses, if structured as contractual commitments over many years; the latter will create imputed interest expenses and depreciation.
  3. Creating and selling AI products: Using the leased AI architecture, AI product and service businesses create products and services that they sell to consumers (individual and enterprise) and record the payment they receive, from either subscription or usage-based models, as revenues. With the LLMs (OpenAI, Anthropic), these products are AI agents and frontier models where users pay either in subscriptions or based upon usage, and net of the costs of creating these products, hopefully into profits. 
The linkages between the companies in the AI ecosystem described in the section above are operating linkages that are part and parcel of doing business, but there are financial linkages, though, the motives for which I will examine later in this post, that are messier. In particular,  AI companies have funded each other, with both equity and debt. Microsoft and Nvidia are shareholders in OpenAI, Alphabet and Amazon in Anthropic and Nvidia has also provided financial backstops for data centers being built out. These financial cross holdings create accounting noise (with mark ups of equity investments reported as earnings) and contribute to opacity.

The Timing of Benefits

    Given that AI infrastructure can take years to come online, there will be timing differences across the groups, in terms of seeing the benefits from their business models, with AI suppliers being the first to see revenues and profits, followed by AI builders, with AI product & service businesses generally being last to see profitability.

1. Hope and Hype        

    In the first phases of a disruption, the visions of a huge market often drive actions on the part of all of the AI groups, but the way they play out and how they show up in results will vary:

  • The suppliers of the ingredients that go into AI infrastructure will be the first to see tangible benefits as the spending on AI architecture shows up immediately as revenues in income statement and as incremental profits. 
  • For AI builders, no matter how merited the build-up (in terms of delivering value over time), the immediate effect on both earnings and cash flows will be negative. The reason the earnings effects has been muted with AI is because the biggest AI infrastructure investors (Meta, Microsoft, Alphabet and Amazon) have earnings and cashflows from legacy businesses and the cloud businesses (thus playing a role asiAI suppliers) that have provided a buffer, but the free cash flow impact has been real.
  • For companies in the AI product group, which are nascent businesses, there will be little to show in terms of revenues, since neither the infrastructure nor the products are ready to go. With R&D and employee compensation expenses, they will be money-losing machines.
For AI, the hope and hype phase was most pronounced in 2023 and 2024, and not surprisingly, the biggest surge in market capitalization during the period was at Nvidia, as its chips became the essential ingredient to get investments going.

2. Investment Buildup

    In this phase, the AI infrastructure building continues at a torrid pace, but portions of it are complete and ready for use, and the consequences again will vary for the groups involved:

  • As growth in AI infrastructure continues, AI suppliers will continue to see growth in revenues and profit from the continued building, though growth rates will come down with scale. In addition, new entrants may start to compete on prices, reducing pricing power at least for some of the supplier groups.
  • For Ai builders, the portion of the AI that is ready to use can be leased out, allowing for a monetization of at least a portion of the AI investment. Since the investment continues to increase, and much of it is still not operational, on measures like return on capital, the AI buildup investment will not measure up. Markets will often be willing to forgive, at least with managers that they trust, on the assumption that things will get better over time.
  • As AI infrastructure comes online, AI product companies can start generating products and services, and to the extent that they are growing from small scale, growth rates can be exponential. Those revenues though will generally be dwarfed by expenses from product development, continued research, and employee compensation, leaving the companies with large losses.
  • With AI users,  a mix of early adopters and experimenters, in a subset of industries where AI is viewed as having the most promise, will emerge. Given AI’s strengths, software businesses were among the first to be exposed to AI products, with consequences for competitive position and profitability, but AI agents also have found a foothold in white collar businesses.
Through much of 2025, AI suppliers continued to benefit, AI builders invested hundreds of billions of dollars in AI cap ex, seemingly without much pushback, the product companies drew attention with frontier models that dazzled users with their mix of power, albeit with rough edges, and markets continued to reward them all, based on its perception of market potential.

3. Business Building

    A big end market notwithstanding, business building is hard and in this phase it is inevitable that questions will turn to unit economics, economies of scale and eventual profitability, with each group facing different degrees of questioning.

  • By this stage, AI suppliers should have fully formed business models, but revenue growth rates will ease, as new infrastructure spend becomes smaller, at least on relative terms. As builders try to develop cheaper supply sources, either by bringing some of it in-house or by looking at competitors, margins will start to compress, and you will see some suppliers focus on the infrastructure replenishment/replacement market, rather than on new infrastructure. Since markets are forward-looking, the pricing of these companies will reflect expectations of lower growth and the companies will look cheap on a pricing basis (low PE ratios, low EV multiples), relative to their history.
  • As more infrastructure becomes operational, AI builders will begin to see more revenues and earnings from existing investments, but the magnitude will depend largely on whether demand from AI product companies is running ahead of capacity (good for revenues and earnings) or behind (bad for revenues and earnings). As returns on invested capital pick up, markets will make their own assessments of whether they will end up adding or destroying value, and reassess the pricing of these companies accordingly.
  • AI product companies will jockey for position in the market, looking for ways to differentiate their products and preserve pricing power. With compute power being a key driver of both AI model power and growth in revenues, AI companies will try to not only get more AI infrastructure under control, but, if it is scarce, lock it for the long term. In the aftermath, AI product companies with a duration problem, where AI compute commitments are locked up long term, while their revenue streams are still in their formative phase and subject to short term volatility. Again, the forward-looking nature of markets implies that the pricing of these companies will look high, relative to current operating numbers, but that pricing will be volatile, as markets reassess prospects.
  • AI users will find themselves on the receiving end of sales pitches for AI products and services, with the key selling point being improved productivity, with the warning included that not buying these products will put them at a disadvantage, relative to competitors.  For AI to find its business feet, you need the customer base for AI products and services to become both wider (cutting across many different industries) and deeper (where customers spend far more on AI, on a repeat basis). 
There are three broad scenarios that can unfold.  The first is that AI products and services work much better than expected, and that the demand for these products runs ahead of expectations. In this scenario, AI product companies will benefit first, since they will see growing revenues and higher pricing power, which create the unit economics and economies of scale for escalating profits, but the benefits will ripple to the AI builders, allowing them to increase capacity, which in turn will lift AI supplers. The second is that AI products and services work about as well as expected, with demand matching up to expectations. In this case, AI product companies should, at least in the aggregate, hold their own, but as with any competitive business, some will gain at the expense of others. There will be both business consequences, as weaker players drop out, and market implications, as the market adjusts the pricing for the survivors. The third is that AI products and services work less well than expected, with demand and monetization falling well below expectations. This will hurt not just the AI product companies who will struggle to meet revenue targets, but ripple through the other groups, as product companies either break or renegotiate compute commitments, hurting builders, who in turn, will shut down or abandon infrastructure capacity, creating pain for AI suppliers.

Commonalities and Competing Interests

    Even though the businesses in the AI space have very different business models, there is one common element that holds them together; the value of all of the players in the ecosystem ultimately will be determined by the size of the AI market and its profitability. As I noted in my earlier posts on AI, if the end market for AI products and services is small, because of the imperfections as AI tools, regulatory restrictions or limited reach, the entire AI ecosystem (builders, suppliers and product businesses will all feel the pain. Conversely, if AI delivers on its promise as a powerful productivity tool that works across many businesses, all of them benefit, albeit in different forms and different degrees. If history is a guide, it is the product companies that will be the primary benefactors, but the central role of compute power in the AI business may give AI builders and suppliers more of a share. In addition, if one of the groups faces growth and survival challenges, those pains will spread into the other groups as well. That may explain why you see so much circular financing in the AI ecosystem, where financially better- positioned and stronger players like Nvidia invest in or offer financing guarantees to weaker players, either to ensure survival or to provide an impetus for continued investment spending.

    Those common interests notwithstanding, these businesses also have competing agendas, and decisions and actions that affect one group negatively can create benefit for others. Thus, if AI builders choose to build too much infrastructure, too quickly, it will hurt them and their shareholders, but that overbuilding will be a bonanza for the AI suppliers, as chips, equipment, power and real estate players all benefit from the overbuilding. Once built, it is in the AI builders' interests to lease out the infrastructure for longer periods than merited, locking in their revenue streams, but for the AI product companies, those long term commitments can increase default risk. In short, as the AI business matures, I would expect these competing interests will often overwhelm the common interests, creating divergence. 

    For much of AI's early existence, the commonalities have overwhelmed the competing interests, with the hope of a large market for AI products and services pushing up market pricing for all of the groups, with AI chip companies like Nvidia being rewarded for the expected growth in AI architecture, hyperscalers seeing their pricing marked up, when they spend more on architecture, and the compute power commitments atAI product companies being viewed as a competitive plus, rather than minus. That, in a nutshell, has been the AI trade, but as the AI disruption moves through the disruption, it is inevitable that this will change, with the market differentiating across groups, picking winners and losers.

AI Companies - Letting the Data Speak!

    With that long lead-in, I think that we are better positioned to take a look at the AI trade, both in terms of where it is right now and where it may be going next. I do believe that the easy AI trade, where you could buy any company that was part of the AI ecosystem (supplier, buyer or product) and make money from a general optimism about AI’s potential is mostly done, and there are many traders who can point to profits they made from that trade. While last week’s market collapse in AI stocks may have drawn attention, the AI trade has been far shakier in 2026, as strength is some AI groups has masked weakness in others, reflecting a market trying to discern differences across companies in the space. To get an empirical measure of how the different AI groups have performed this year, I create samples of companies in each of the three AI groups (supplier, builder, user) and before you take issue with my choices, I will concede on four points:

  • Public vs Private: Data availability and the requirement that there be a market price restricts the sample to publicly traded companies. That not only reduces sample size and creates sampling bias, but it also has disparate effects across the different groups. In particular, two of the biggest players in the AI products grouping, OpenAI and Anthropic, as well as almost all of the smaller players (Mistral, Qwen and Deepseek) do not make it into the sample, because they stayed privately held, and SpaceX enters the public company sample in the middle of 2026.
  • Missed companies and changing sample: Since there is no separate accounting categorization for AI-related revenues and expenses, I relied on public descriptions of the companies operating in each of three AI groupings. Those descriptions are likely to be incomplete, but the companies that are missed are smaller and lower-profile companies, in terms of both operating metrics and market capitalization. In addition,  as companies go public or exit the market, there will be changes in the sample.
  • Not pure plays: Most of the companies in this sample operate in other businesses, many of which pre-date their entry into AI. This is especially true of the hyperscalers, where Amazon, Alphabet, Meta and Microsoft have legacy businesses that generate large earnings and market value. That will make it difficult to isolate the AI effect on market capitalization, because changes in market cap at these companies will be driven not just by their AI actions, but by legacy business performance.
  • In multiple groupings: Some of the companies in this sample operate in more than one grouping. Meta, Alphabet and Microsoft, in addition to be major investors in AI cap ex, are working on their own versions of LLM (Muse for Meta, Gemini for Alphabet and Co-Pilot for Microsoft) to enter the product market. I have included SpaceX as an AI product company, but at the moment, almost all of its revenues on its AI arm come from leasing out its compute power to Anthropic and Alphabet, making it more of an AI builder than AI product company.
With those caveats in place, here are the public companies that I have in each grouping:


Not surprisingly, given where AI is in the disruption cycle, with AI architecture is in its build phase, and products still nascent,  we have far more publicly listed companies that are involved in supplying the materials needed for the architecture - chips, electrical, power and real estate/construction, than in the other group.  To get a measure of how each grouping has performed as the AI boom has unfolded, I looked at the aggregated market capitalization of companies in each group from 2022 to 2025:


As you can see, the market capitalization of each of the groupings surged over the three year period, with AI chips companies having the biggest increase, in both dollar and percentage terms, over the period; Nvidia was the biggest contributor. The AI product segment also surged, but the value of the publicly traded companies in this space is small, as the biggest companies (OpenAI, Anthropic and xAI) were still privately owned during this period. The stock returns of AI builders lagged other AI groups but, but  their market cap increased 180% between 2022 and 2025, even as they were spending hundreds of billions in AI cap ex, with little to show as returns on that investment. Cumulatively, AI companies outpaced the rest of the market substantially over this period, rising as a percent of the market.
    Have things changed in 2026? To answer that question, I looked at how these AI groups have performed during the year:
AI products group percentage change does not include SPCX

Looking at the year-to-date numbers for 2026, AI chips and AI real estate have run ahead of the market, and the rest of the AI groups lag the market; again, you should read the AI products and services grouping with caution, because it has only three companies in it, and SpaceX made its entry into the group mid-year. In fact, AI companies, in the aggregate, increased their share of overall US equity market capitalization for much of the year, peaking at about 37% on September 30, 2026. Since the end of the third quarter of 2026, though, every AI group has struggled, with the exception of AI real estate & construction. Last week, in particular, was a testing one for AI companies, with Thursday (November 5) standing out and in the figure below, I report the dollar value changes of each group by day:



On November 5 alone, AI stocks lost almost $1.8 trillion in market cap, with chip stocks taking the brunt of the hit. During the course of the the last week, the AI chip and AI electrical groupings took a beating, but most of the other groups held their own. In fact, the hyperscalers, with the four Mag Seven companies in their midst, actually saw an aggregate increase in market cap during the week. It is a small sample, and there is a danger that I am overreaching, but if the immediate aftermath of last Tuesday's elections is a slowing down of data center construction, it stands to reason that the first companies to be affected will be the AI suppliers, who are dependent on growing construction for their growth. In fact, given that shareholders in the hyperscalers have become increasingly concerned about the magnitude of AI cap ex spending, they may very well welcome a slowdown.

An Assessment of AI as investment: The Big Market Delusion!

    I would like to think that I have kept an open mind about AI's business potential, in my writings, and I have been taken to task by AI advocates, for not being optimistic enough about the size of the AI market, and by AI skeptics, who believe that I am inflating its size. In almost all of my writing about AI, though, I have argued that it is exposed to what I call the big market delusion, where the potential of a big markets in conjunction with overconfidence on the part of founders, VCs and CEOs, leads to over investment and a correction. The picture below is the generic version:


I am seldom certain about anything in markets, but I believe that AI, because of its reach and potential, almost certainly has led to over investment, by AI builders, over commitments to compute power by LLM companies and over pricing, by the market, at least in the aggregate. The correction, when it comes, will cause pain, but the pain will be distributed unevenly, and for those who believe that AI has potential but have found the companies in the space over priced, it will provide opportunities. Before you decide that this (the over investment, over pricing and subsequent correction) is a problem, it is worth noting that this phenomenon is a feature, not a bug, that is associated with uncertainty and big change, and that it is, in spite of the costs of the cleanup, is a pre-requisite for change.

    This big market delusion suggests that you should either not buy any of the companies in the AI space or even sell short on these companies, but here is why you may not arrive at that conclusion:

  1. Uncertainty about correction (when and what form): Even if you are right that investor and business overconfidence has lead to overreach, you need the market to come to agree with you, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to try to predict when in will happen, and what form it will take. The obvious response that many investors have is to just avoid AI companies for the moment, but since it is just a large portion of the market, this becomes a variant on market timing, with questionable payoffs.
  2. Catalysts for correction: The catalysts that trigger the correction can  be bad news about a leading Ai company, a macro or political event that makes investors reassess the landscape, and history offers little useful guidance. The big market delusion is ultimately built on a behavioral characteristic (over confidence) and the correction has as much to do with investor psychology, as with financial fundamentals. It is one reason why I am not quick to dismiss charts and technical indicators (price and volume) as investing voodoo, since these tools may be better attuned to detecting these mood and momentum shifts. 
  3. Acting in the fact of uncertainty: Since the correction process is difficult to time, if you are an investor of long standing in one of AI’s many winners, you should use each correction phase to sell a portion of your shares. You will give up upside, by doing so, but you will not be completely exposed, when the correction happens. If you decide to buy AI stocks after the correction, don’t wait for the bottom, since you may never hit it. Find the companies in the AI marketplace that you would like to own, set a trigger pricing or a valuation at which you would buy, and automate the process. Thus, if you like SpaceX, but only if its market cap is $1 trillion, put in a limit buy at that value, and let it get filled automatically. 
  4. Go where it is darkest: One of the themes of my valuation and investment philosophy classes is that the payoff to assessing fundamentals and valuing companies is greatest in sectors and at times of maximum uncertainty. If you are an AI advocate, and you have generated supersized returns over the last four or five years from just buying companies in the AI space,  you are entering a phase, where  even if your AI optimism holds, you should prepare yourself for more periods like last Thursday, where the market mood on AI darkens, and use those periods to be more discriminating in your AI investment choices.
For those of you have read this far expecting a clear signal of whether now is the time to sell or buy, I know that you may find my conclusions to diffuse to be actionable. 

Implications for Anthropic IPO
    Since I have spent much of the last few weeks valuing Anthropic, ahead of its IPO, and following up on that valuation, there is no avoiding the question of what the market and political turmoil in the two weeks will do that IPO. I have seen rumors floating around of a cut in the IPO pricing (from the initial estimate of $1.5 to $2 trillion to a lower number and some that the IPO may be delayed into next year. 
  • As I noted in an earlier post, IPOs are priced, and in young businesses, with uncommon metrics. After not hearing talk of annualized revenue run rates for a few weeks, there was a leak that Anthropic's ARR for October hit $80 billion, which was touted as both good news (by some) and bad news by others. The truth is that pricing is a mood and momentum game, and it is undeniable that the mood has darkened not just for AI, but also for the market in the last two weeks. If you consider bankers who are terrified of over pricing a trillion-dollar plus offering and picking up the pieces, the pressures to lower the offer price only get stronger.
  • On the valuation front, it is not market mood that matters but events that change the fundamentals. The most critical of these were the election results, where voters sent a clear message about their aversion to data centers. In Texas, which is home to about a third of the new data centers coming online in the near term, it may not stop existing data center construction, but it will slow the growth of data centers, at least in the United States. It is also possible that the newly elected congress will write in tighter restrictions on AI, creating a bigger drag on margins.  For those who are more focused on seeing the glass as half full, this will also vindicate Anthropic's rush to lock in compute power commitments, before the rules of the game changed, and the limits on data centers may give Anthropic a moat against competitors. Just to give you a measure of how sensitive the Anthropic valuation is to these changes, increasing how much Anthropic will have to invest to add compute power in future years (by lowering the sales to cap ratio from 3 to 2.5) and increasing the drag on margins from regulation (from 5% to 7.5%) reduces the estimated equity value to $1.25 trillion, even if you leave the target revenues at a trillion dollars.
I have no sources in investment banks, but I think that this IPO is too far along for bankers and the company to withdraw or delay, without markets reading worst case scenarios into their actions. That said, I would not be surprised to see Antrhopic priced closer than $1.25 trillion, with perhaps a smaller cash raise (with fewer shares being offered), allowing for that "price jump" on the trading day and a buzz that carries over.

Conclusion
    As AI moves from the hype phase to business building, I hope that we stop talking about  "the AI trade",  as a catch all for AI companies, and start differentiating between the different groups for two reasons. The first is that as the AI business starts to take form, there will be developments that are good for one group and bad for others; the election results clearly affected AI suppliers more negatively than it did AI builders. The second is that when you have crises, the market will lose its head and mark down all AI companies indiscriminately, offering you the chance to buy those that you believe should not have been marked down.   I also think that it is time that we stop making overly broad assessments of the AI business that lock us into our priors. Thus, if you start with the presumption that the entire AI phenomenon is a "bubble" (notice that this is the first time in the post that I have used that word), your mind is already made up and no AI company, no matter what group it belongs to, will be worth its price. That view, no matter how strongly held, would have kept you out of a segment that has added almost $18 trillion in market capitalization between 2023 and 2026, and even with a strong market correction, it is likely that staying out of the AI bubble would outweigh what you would have earned by investing in some of these companies. At the other extreme, if you are so dazzled by the technology that you see this as a sure win, you are setting yourself for disappointment, because not only are there no sure wins in equity markets, but the pathway to AI nirvana will be come with challenges that test your faith. In short, stay with your beliefs about AI but leave the door open for different opinions.

YouTube

Spreadsheets

Blog Posts on AI in 2026

  1. To a Trillion Dollars and Beyond: A SpaceX Odyssey!
  2. Revisiting SpaceX: A post-Prospectus valuation
  3. OpenAI, Anthropic and SpaceX: The S&P 500 Inclusion Question and Investment Consequences
  4. AI Scenarios: From Doomsday to Do-nothing!
  5. AI's Bar Mitzvah: From hope & hype to business questions!
  6. Stock Prices, Earnings and Cashflows: The AI Effect!
  7. From Eyeballs to ARR: Buzzy Pricing Metrics and the Anthropic Pricing
  8. The Anthropic Prospectus Arrives: My (but not the) valuation of Anthropic
  9. Heeding the Anthropic Feedback Loop: Cost of capital delusions and distractions!



Saturday, May 3, 2025

The Greed & Fear Tango: The Markets in April 2025!

    I started the month on a trip to Latin America, just as the tariff story hit my newsfeed and the market reacted with a sell off that knocked more than $9 trillion in market cap for global equities in the next two days. The month was off to a bad start, and tariffs remained the lead story for much of the month, contributing to both its biggest down days (with stories of trade war escalation) and to the biggest up days (with news of relief from the fight). To add to the volatility, there was talk midway through the month of replacing Jerome Powell as the Fed Chair, and assorted news adding to uncertainty about the direction of the economy. An observer reading just the news stories and asked to guess what the market did during the month would probably have bet on stocks falling steeply, but he or she would have lost that bet, because markets managed to surprise us all again, ending the month almost where they began.

Equities: Storm Clouds gather (and dissipate)!
    It would be an understatement to describe equity markets in April 2025 as volatile, with the equity indices going through stomach wrenching up and down movements intraday and across days, as investors struggled to price in a world of tariffs, trade wars and policy uncertainty.

The journey that the indices went through during the course of the month has been extraordinary. Each of the indices lost close to 10%  in the first two days of the month, went deeper into the hole in the second week of the month, but by the end of the month, they had each found their way back to almost where they started the month at, with the S&P 500, NASDAQ and the MSCI world index all within 1% of their start-of-the-month levels.
    As I noted in my post right after the first couple of days of this month, where I framed the market crisis around tariffs, the indices sometimes obscure markets shifts that are occurring under the surface, and that looking at all publicly traded stocks on an aggregated basis provides a more complete picture. I will start by looking at the regional breakdown of what the month delivered in terms of change in market cap, in both dollar and percentage terms:


The crisis may have been birthed in the United States, but as has been the case with market crises in this century, it has spread across the world, with disparate impacts. There are truly no standouts in either direction, with China being the worst performing region, in terms of percentage change in dollar value, down 3.69%, and India and Latin America tied for best performing, up 3.57%.  These are dollar returns, and since the US dollar came under selling pressure during the course of the month, the local currency returns were worse, especially in markets, like the EU, where the Euro gained about 5% in the courser of the month.
    At the start of the month, as has been the case for much of the last decade, the focus was on technology, partly because of its large weight in overall equity value at the start of 2025, and partly because of the punishment meted out to tech stocks during the first quarter of the year.  Focusing just on US equities, technology companies, which accounted for 29.4% of the overall market capitalization of all US companies at the start of 2025, lost $2.34 trillion (about 13.19%) in market capitalization in the first quarter of 2025. In the first few days of April, that trend continued as technology initially led the rout, losing an additional $1.78 trillion, but by the end of April, tech had made at least a partial comeback:

As you can see, technology ended the month as the second best performing sector, up 1.67% for the month, and in spite of the handwringing about their poor performance, their share of the market cap pie has barely changed after the first four months of 2025. While the first quarter continues to weigh the sector down, as was the case in 2022, the obituaries written for technology investing may have been premature.
    Staying in the weeds, I also looked at the push and pull of growth versus value, by breaking US equities down into deciles based on earnings to price ratios and assessing their performance leading into April and in April 2025 alone:

As you can see, while there is no clearly discernible pattern across deciles of US stocks based upon earnings to price ratios, breaking down US stocks into a top and bottom half, based upon the ratio, yields the conclusion that while high PE stocks had a bad start to the year, losing 10.9% of their value in the first quarter, they made a comeback in April, up 1.74% for the year,  while low PE stocks were down 2.22% for the month. That pattern of a reversal in April 2025 of trends that had been forming in the first quarter of 2025 shows upon in other proxies for the value versus growth tussle:
  • Looking at companies broken down by market capitalization into deciles, you find that larger cap companies outperformed small cap stocks during April, 
  • Breaking down stocks based on dividends, dividend paying stocks and companies buying back stock underperformed non-cash returning stocks, indicating that there was no flight to safety in April.
    Finally, I classified companies based upon their stock price performance in 2024 to see if what we are seeing in 2025 is just a correction of overreach in 2024. After all, if that is the case, we should see the stocks that have performed the best in 2024 be the ones that have taken the most punishment this year:

As you can see, momentum returned in force in April, with the best performing stocks in 2024 up 0.76% during the month, while the worst performing stocks of 2024 were down 5.31% for the month. In fact, the year-to-date numbers for 2025 indicate that momentum remains in the driver's seat, extending a long period of outperformance. 
    In sum, the market stresses in April 2025 seems to have pushed the market back into its 2024 ways, after a first quarter that promised reversal, as technology, growth and momentum all made a comeback in the last three weeks of April. The performance of the Mag Seven, which represent a combination of all three forces (large, high growth and technology), in April provides a tangible measure of this shift:


The Mag Seven have had a bad year to date, losing $2.6 trillion in market capitalization, but they made a comeback from the depths to finish April at about the same market cap that they had at the start of the month, recovering almost all of the $1.55 trillion that they lost in the first week of the month.
    In short, not only did equities recover in the last three weeks of April 2025, but there seems have been a shift in sentiment back the forces that have borne markets upwards for the last few years, with technology, growth and momentum returning as market drivers. Of course, three weeks is a short time, but this is a trend worth watching for the rest of this year.

The Rest of the Market: Swirling Winds?
    As equities careened through April 2025 between panic and delirium, the other asset classes were surprisingly staid, at least on the surface, starting with the US treasuries. Unlike other crises, where US treasuries saws funds flow in, pushing down yields and pushing up prices, treasury rates remained relatively stable through much of April:



Not only did rates remain almost unchanged across the maturity spectrum, but they were stable on a week-to-week basis. The yield curve, downward sloping for much of the last two years,  is now u-shaped, with 3-month rates and 2-year rates higher than 5-year rates, before reverting back to higher longer term (10-year and 30-year rates). Coming from the camp that we read too much economic significance into yield curve slopes and dynamics, I am reluctant to draw big conclusions, but some of this can be attributed to expectations of higher inflation in the near term. There is another force at play in this crisis that has not been as visible in past ones, at least in the US treasury market, and that is concerns about the trustworthiness of the US government Though this is still an early indicator, that can be seen in the sovereign CDS market, where investors pay for insurance against default risk, and where the US CDS spread has risen in April:


The sovereign CDS spread for the US has risen about 38% during the course of this month, and the interesting part is that much of that rise happened in the last three weeks of the month, and during the first week, when equities were collapsing. The rise in perceptions of US default risk is more likely to have been precipitated by the threat to fire Jerome Powell, and by extension to the independence of the Fed as an institution. While that threat was withdrawn, the sovereign CDS spread has stayed high, and it will be worth watching whether it will come back down or whether some permanent damage has been done to US treasuries as a safe haven. As some of you who follow my thinking on riskfree rates may know, I argue that the riskfree rate in a currency is not necessarily the government bond rate in that currency, and that the default spread has to netted out from the government bond rate two get to a riskfree rate, if the sovereign in question is not viewed as default-free. Building on that principle, I may soon have to revisit my practice of using the US treasury rate as the riskfree rate in US dollars and net out a default spread for the US from that rate to get to a riskfree rate.
    During April 2025, commodity prices were also on the move, and in the graph below, I look at oil prices as well as an overall commodity index during the month: 


In the first third of the month, oil prices, in particular, and commodity prices, in general, joined equities, as they moved down, but in the last part of the month, they delinked, and stayed down, even as stock prices bounced back up. To the extent that the demand for commodities is driven by real economic growth, that would suggest that at least in the near term, the tariffs that precipitated the crisis will slow down global economies and reduce demand for commodities. 
    The concerns about central banking independence that triggered the surge in the US sovereign CDS spread also played out in currency markets, where the US dollar, already weakened in the first quarter, continued its decline in April. In the graph below, I look at the dollar-euro exchange rate and an index measuring the strength of the dollar against multiples currencies.


The dollar continued its decline in April, down about 3% against a broad basket of currencies, and more than 5% against the Euro. 
    Finally, I looked at two other investment classes - gold and bitcoin - for the same reasons that I brought them into the discussion at the start of April. They are collectibles, i.e., investments that investors are drawn to during crisis periods or when they lose faith in paper currencies and governments:


Download data
Gold had a good month in April, up about 5.3%, and hitting $3.500 towards the end of the month, but Bitcoin did even better rising almost 14.12% during the course of the month. That said, the fact that financial asset markets (equity and bond) recovered over the second part of the month made this a month where collectibles were not put to their test as crisis investments, and the rise in both can be attributed more to the loss of trust that has driven  the sovereign CDS spread up and the US dollar down.

Risk and Co-movement
    Early in April, I argued that the one number that would track the balance between greed and fear in markets would be the price of risk in markets, and I resolved to estimate that price every day, through April, for both equity and bond markets. With equity markets, the price of risk is the equity risk premium, and at least  in my estimation process, it is a forward-looking number determined by the level of stock prices and expected cash flows. In the table below, I report on my estimates of the equity risk premium for the S&P 500 every trading day in April, in conjunction with the VIX, and equity volatility index that should be correlated:

Download day-to-day data

After rising above 5% in the first third of the month, the equity risk premium decreased in fits and starts over the rest of the month to end at almost the same value (4.58%) as at the start of the month (4.59%). In parallel, the VIX soared in the first few days of the month to peak at 52.33 on April 8, and then decreased over the rest of the month to a level (24.70) close to where it was at the start of the month (22.28).
    In the bond market, the price of risk takes the form of default spreads, and these spreads followed a similar path to the equity risk measures:
Download data

The default spread on high yield bonds surged, rising by more than 1% between the start of the month and April 7, before declining, but unlike the equity risk measures, the bond default spreads did end the month at levels higher than at the start, indicating at least at this point that near term concerns about the economy and the ensuing default risk have not subsided.
    As a final exercise, I looked at the correlation in price changes across investment classes - stocks, treasuries, investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds, commodities, gold and bitcoin:

Download data

With the caveat that this is just 22 trading days in one month, it does yield some preliminary results about co-movements. First, stock and treasury bond prices moved together much of the month, not something that you would expect during a crisis, when bond prices gain as stock prices fall. Second, while both gold and bitcoin prices moved with stocks, gold prices movements were more closely tied to stock price movements, at least during the month. In sum, the movement across asset markets affirms our conclusion from looking at company-level data that this was more a month of asset reprising than panic selling or buying.
    In sum, if I were to summarize what the data is pointing me towards, here are the general conclusions that I would draw, albeit with a small sample:
  1. The market movements through much of the month were less driven by panic and more by investors trying to reprice companies to reflect a world with more trade barriers and tariffs and political turmoil.
  2. While equities, in the aggregate, ended the month roughly where they started the month, a shift in sentiment seemed to occur in the last three weeks of the month, as technology, growth and momentum, three forces that seemed to be in retreat in the first quarter of 2025, made a come back.
  3. With US treasuries, there was little movement on the rates, but under the surface, there were shifts  that could be tectonic in the long term. There was clearly a drop in trust in the US government and its institutions, which played out in rising sovereign CDS spreads and a declining dollar, and trust once lost can be difficult to gain back.
  4. The investment classes that are most vulnerable to the real economy, i.e.. commodities and higher yield corporate bonds, were down for the month, indicating a slowing down of global economic growth.
In the coming months, we will see whether the last three weeks of April were an aberration or the start of something bigger.

Lessons Learned
    Every market meltdown carries pain to investors, but that pain is often spread unevenly across these investors, with the variation driven as much as by what they held coming into the crisis, as it is by how they behaved in response to the sell off. I am not sure April 2025 falls into the crisis column, but it did feel like one early in the month, and as I look back at the month, I come back to three market characteristics that stood out.
  1. Market resilience: In the last five years, markets have repeatedly not only got the big trends right, but they have also shown far more resilience than any expert group. I would wager that if you had given a group of macro economists or market strategists just the news stories that came out during the course of the month and asked them to guess how they would play out in market reaction, almost none of them would have guessed the actual outcome (of flat markets). At the time of COVID, I argued that one reason for market resilience is that market influence has become diffuse, with social media and alternative sources of information supplementing and often replacing the traditional influencers - the financial press, media and investment talking heads, and market movements are less driven by large portfolio managers exhibiting herd behavior and more by disparate groups of traders, with different motives, models and patterns. 
  2. Market power: A key reason for the turnaround in markets during April was the administration's decision to walk back, reverse or delay actions that the market reacted to strongly and negatively. The "liberation day" tariffs that triggered the initial sell off have largely been put on hold or suspended, and the talk about replacing the Fed Chair was walked back quickly the week after it was made. In short, an administration that has been impervious to Wall Street journal editorials, warnings from economists and counter threats from other governments has been willing to bend to market selling pressure.
  3. Market unpredictability: As markets rose and fell during the course of the month, the debate about the value added by active investing kicked into full gear. I heard quite a few advocates of active investing argue that it was during times like this (volatility and crisis) that the "sage counsel" and "timely decisions" of wealth or fund managers would protect investors on the downside. I would suggest the opposite, and am willing to bet that the extent of damage that April did to investor portfolios was directly proportional to how much time they spent watching CNBC and listening to (or reading) what market experts told them to do.
On a personal note, I stuck to my resolution early in the crisis to use it to stay true to my investment philosophy. As someone who stinks at market timing, I made no attempt to buy and sell the market through the month, perhaps leaving a great deal of money on the table, or more likely, saving myself just as much from getting the timing wrong. In the middle of April, I talked about three strands of  contrarian investing, and in that post, I put myself  in the opportunistic contrarian camp. I did use the mid-month sell off to add BYD, a stock that I like, to my portfolio, when its price dipped below my limit price ($80). Palantir and Mercado Libre (my two other limit buys) came close but not low enough to break through my limits, but I am willing to wait, revisiting my valuations along the way.
    I do have some portfolio maintenance work that I need to do in the coming weeks, especially on the six of the seven Mag Seven stocks that remain in my portfolio (Tesla is out of my portfolio and Nvidia is at a quarter of my original holding). As these companies report their first quarter earnings, I plan to revisit my valuations from last year, when in the face of mild to moderate over valuation, I chose to maintain my holdings. As in prior years, I will post my assessments of value and my hold/sell judgments, but that has to wait because I do have more immediate priorities. First, as a teacher, with the semester end approaching, I have a stack of grading that has to get done. Second, as a father, I am looking forward to my daughter having her first child next week, and the market and my portfolio take a distant second place to getting acquainted with my new granddaughter.

YouTube Video

My Posts (from April 2025)

Data Links


Monday, April 7, 2025

Anatomy of a Market Crisis: Tariffs, Markets and the Economy!

I was boarding a plane for a trip to Latin America late in the evening last Wednesday (April 2), and as is my practice, I was checking the score on the Yankee game, when I read the tariff news announcement. Coming after a few days where the market seemed to have found its bearings (at least partially), it was clear from the initial reactions across the world that the breadth and the magnitude of the tariffs had caught most by surprise, and that a market markdown was coming. Not surprisingly, the markets opened down on Thursday and spent the next two days in that mode, with US equity indices declining almost 10% by close of trading on Friday. Luckily for me, I was too busy on both Thursday and Friday with speaking events, since as the speaker, I did not have the luxury (or the pain) of checking markets all day long. In my second venue, which was Buenos Aires, I quipped that while Argentina was trying its best to make its way back from chaos towards stability, the rest of the world was looking a lot more like Argentina, in terms of uncertainty. On Saturday, on a long flight back to New York, I wrestled with the confusion, denial and panic that come with a market meltdown, and tried to make sense of what had happened, and more importantly of what is coming. That thinking is still a work-in-progress but as in prior crises, I find that putting even unfinished thoughts down on paper (or in a post) is healthy, and perhaps a critical component to finding your way back to serenity.

The Tariffs and Markets

    Since talk of tariffs has filled the airwaves for most of this year, you may wonder why markets reacted so strongly to the announcement on Wednesday. One reason might have been that investors and businesses were not expecting the tariff hit to be as wide and as deep as they turned out to be.     

Note that while Canada and Mexico were not on the Wednesday list of tariff targets that was released on Wednesday, they have been targeted separately, and that the remaining countries that do not show up on this map (Russia and North Korea, for instance) are under sanctions that prevent them from trading in the first place. 

    Another reason for the market reaction was that the basis for the tariff estimates, which have now been widely shared, are not easily fixable, since they are not based on tariffs imposed by other countries, but on the magnitude of the trade deficit of the United States with these countries. Thus, any country with which the US runs a significant trade deficit faces a large tariff, and smaller countries are more exposed than larger ones since the trade deficit is computed on a percentage basis, from exports and imports related to that country.  Thus, the easy out, where other countries offer to reduce or even remove their tariffs may have no or little effect on the tariffs, to the extent that the trade deficit may have little to do with tariffs.      

Equities

    The extent of the market hit can be seen by looking at the major US equity indices, the Dow, the S&P 500 and the NASDAQ, all of which shed significant portions of their value on Thursday and Friday:

Looking beyond these indices and across the globe, the negative reaction has been global, as can be seen in the returns to equity across sub-regions, with all returns denominated in US dollars:

The worst hit regions of the world is Small Asia, which is Asia not counting India, China and Japan, which saw equity values in the aggregate decline by 12.61% in the last week. US equities had the biggest decline in dollar value terms, losing $5.3 trillion in value last week, a 9.24% decline in value from the Friday close on March 28, 2025. China and India have held up the best in the last week, perhaps because both countries have large enough domestic markets to sustain them through a trade war. It is also a factory that with time differences, these markets both closed before the Friday beatdown on Wall Street unfolded, and the open on Monday may give a better indication of the true reaction. Breaking down just US equities, by sector, we can see the damage across sectors:
The technology sector lost the most in value last week, both in dollar terms, shedding almost $1.8 trillion (and 11.6%) in equity value, and consumer staples and utilities held up the best, dropping 2.30% and 4.40% respectively. In percentage terms, energy stocks have lost the most in value, with market capitalizations dropping by 14.2%, dragged down by declining oil prices.
    Staying with US equities, and breaking down companies, based upon their market capitalizations coming into 2025, we can again see write downs in equity value across the spectrum from last week's sell off:
As you can see, it looks like there is little to distinguish across the market cap spectrum, as the pain was widely distributed across the market cap classes, with small and large companies losing roughly the same percent of value. To the extent that market crisis usually cause a flight to safety, I looked at US stocks, broken down by decile into earnings yield (Earnings to price ratios), over the last week:

The lowest earnings to price ratio (highest PE) stocks, in the aggregate, lost 10.91% of their market capitalization last week, compared to the 8.08% decline in market cap at the highest earnings to price (lowest PE ratio) companies, providing some basis for the flight to safety hypothesis. Staying with the safety theme, I looked at US companies, broken down by debt burden (measured as debt to EBITDA):

On this dimension, the numbers actually push against the flight to safety hypothesis, since the companies with the least debt performed worse than those with the most debt. Finally, I looked at whether dividend paying and cash returning companies were better protected in the sell off, by looking at dividend paying (buying back stock) companies versus non-dividend paying (not buying back stock) companies:

While dividend paying stocks did drop by less than non-dividend paying stocks, companies buying back stock underperformed those that did not buy back stock in 2024. 

      If you came into last week, believing that stocks were over priced, you would expect the correction to be worse at companies that have been bid up the most, and to test this, I classified US stocks based upon percentage stock price performance in 2024:


While the worst performers from last year came into the week down only 1.83% through March 28, whereas the best performers from 2024 were down 6.46% over the same period, there was little to distinguish between the two groups last week. 
    Finally, I looked at the Mag Seven stocks, since they have, in large part, carried US equities for much of the last two years;
Collectively, the Mag Seven came into last last week, already down 14.79% for the year (2025), but their losses last week, which massive in dollar value terms ($1.55 trillion) were close in percentage terms to the losses in the rest of the market.

Other Markets

    As equity markets reacted to the tariff announcement, other markets followed. US treasury rates, which had entered the week down from the start of the year, continued to decline during the course of the week:


While the 3-month treasury bill rate remained fairly close to what it was at the start of the week, the rates at the longer end, from 2-year to 30-year all saw drops during the week, perhaps reflecting a search for safety on the part of investors. The drops, at least so far, have been modest and much smaller than what you would expect from a market sell off, where US equities dropped by $5.3 trillion.
    Looking past financial markets, I focused on three diverse markets - the oil market as a stand-in for commodity markets overall, the gold market, representing the time-tested collectible, and Bitcoin, which is perhaps the millennial version of gold:

Oil prices dropped last week, especially as financial asset markets melted down on Thursday and Friday, while both gold and bitcoin held their own last week. For bitcoin advocates, that is good news, since in other market crises since its creation, it has behaved more like risky stock than a collectible. Of course, it I still early in this crisis, and the true tests will come in the next few weeks.  

Summing up

    In sum, the data seems to point more to a mark down in equity values than to panic selling, at least based upon the small sample of two days from last week. There was undoubtedly some panic selling on Friday, but the flight to safety, whether it be in moving into treasuries or high dividend paying stocks, was muted.  

 The Crisis Cycle

    Each crisis is unique both in its origins and in how it plays out, but there is still value in looking across crises, to see how they unfold, what causes them to crest, and how and why they recede. In this section, I will present a crisis cycle, which almost every crisis works its way through, with big differences in how quickly, and with how much damage. The crisis cycle starts with a trigger event, which can be economic, political or financial, though there are often smaller events ahead of is occurrence that point to its coming. The immediate effect is in markets, where investors respond with the only instrument the they control, which is the prices they pay for assets, which they mark down to reflect at least their initial response to the crisis. In the language of risk, they are demanding higher prices for risk, translating into higher risk premiums. In conjunction, they often move their money to safer assets, with treasuries and collectibles historically benefiting from the fund flows. In the days and weeks that follow, there are aftershocks from the trigger event, both on the news and the market fronts, and while these aftershocks can sometimes be positive for markets, the net effect is usually negative. The effects find their way into the real economy, as consumers and businesses pull back, causing an economic slowdown or a recession, with negative effects on earnings and cash flows, at least in the near term. In the long term, the trigger event can change the economic dynamics, causing a resetting of real growth and inflation expectations, which then feed back into markets;


To illustrate, consider the 2008 banking crisis, where the Lehman collapse over the weekend before September 15 triggered a sell off in the stock market that caused equities to drop by 28% between September 12 and December 31, 2008, and triggered a steep recession, causing unemployment to hit double digits in 2009. The earnings for S&P 500 companies took a 40% hit in 2008, and long term, neither the economy nor earnings recovered back to pre-crisis levels until 2012.


During that crisis, I started a practice of estimating equity risk premiums by day, reflecting my belief that it is day-to-day movements in the price of risk that cause equity markets to move as much as they do in a crisis:

Spreadsheet with raw data

Equity risk premiums which started the crisis at around 4% peaked at almost 8% on November 21, 2008, before ending the year at 6.43%, well above the levels at the start of 2008. Those equity risk premiums did not get back to pre-2008 levels until almost 15 years later.
    Moving to 2020 and looking at the COVID crisis, the trigger event was a news story out of Italy about COVID cases in the country that could not be traced to either China or cruise ships, shattering the delusion that the pandemic would be contained to those settings. In the weeks after, the S&P 500 shed 33% of its value before bottoming out on March 23, 2020, and treasury rates plunged to historic lows, hitting 0.76% on that day. The key difference from 2008 was that the damage to the economy and earnings was mostly short term, and by the end of the year, both (economy and earnings) were on the mend, helped undoubtedly by multi-trillion dollar government support and central banking activism:


As in 2008, I computed equity risk premiums by day all through 2020, and the graph below tells the story:
Spreadsheet with raw data

As you can see, the equity risk premium which started at 4.4% on February 14, 2020, peaked a few weeks later at 7.75% on March 23, 2020, and as with the economy and earnings, it was back down to pre-crisis levels by September 2020.

The Perils of Post Mortems

    Each crisis gives rise to postmortems, where investors, regulators and researchers pore over the data, often emerging with conclusions that extrapolate too much from what happened.

  • For investors: The lesson that many investors get out of looking at past crises is that markets come back from even the worst meltdowns, and that contrarian investing with a long time horizon always works. While that may be comforting, this lesson ignores the reality that the fact that a catastrophe did not occur in the crisis in question does not imply that the probability of it occurring was always zero. Markets assess risks in real time.
  • For regulators: To the extent that crises expose the weakest seams in markets and businesses, regulators often come in with fixes for those seams, mostly by dealing with the symptoms, rather than the causes. After the 2008 crisis, the conclusions were that the problems was banks behaving badly and ratings agencies that were not doing their job, both merited judgments, but the question of risk incentives that had led them on their risk taking misadventures were largely left untouched.
  • For researchers: With the benefit of hindsight, regulators weave stories about crises that are built around their own priors, by selectively picking up data items that support them. Thus, behavioral economists find every crisis to be an example of bubbles bursting and corrections for irrational investing, and efficient market theorists use the same crisis as an illustration of the magic of markets working.
It is worth remembering that each crisis is a sample size of one, and since each crises is different, aggregating or averaging across them can be difficult to do. Thus, the danger is that we try to learn too much from past crises rather than too little.

The Tariff Crisis?

    I don't believe that it is premature to put the tariff news and reaction into the crisis category. It has the potential to change the global economic order, and a market reaction is merited. It is, however, early in the process, since we are just past the trigger event (tariff announcement) and the initial market reaction, with lots of unknowns facing us down the road:


There are clearly stages of this crisis that have played out, but based on what we know now, here is how I see them:

  1. After shocks: The tariff story will have after shocks, with both negatives (other countries imposing their own tariffs, and the US responding) and positives (a pause in tariffs, countries dropping tariffs). Those after shocks will create more market volatility, and if history is any guide, there is more downside than upside in the near term. In addition, the market volatility can feed itself, as levered investors are forced to close out positions and fund flows to markets reflect investor concerns and uncertainty. If you add on top of that the possibility that global investors may decide to reduce their US equity holdings, that reallocation will have price effects.
  2. Real economy (near term): In the near term, the real economy will slow down, with the plus being that while tariff-related price increases are coming, a cooling down in the economy will dampen inflation. The likelihood of a recession has spiked in the days since the tariff announcement, and while we will have to wait for the numbers on real growth and unemployment to come in, it does look likely that real growth will be impacted negatively. The steep declines in commodity prices suggests that investors see an economic slowdown on the horizon. As
  3. Real economy (long term): Global economic growth will slow, and the US, as the world’s largest economy, will slow with it.. There are other dynamics at play including a restructuring of old economic and political alliances (Is there a point to having a G7 meeting?) and a new more challenging environment for global companies that have spent the last few decades building supply chains that stretch across the globe, and selling to consumers all over.

It is worth noting that if we measure winning by not the size of the pie (the size of the entire economy) but who gets what slice of that economy, it is possible that tariffs could reapportion the pie, with capital (equity markets) getting a smaller slice, and workers getting a larger slice,. In fact, much of this administration's defense of the tariff has been on this front, and time will tell whether that works out to be the case.
    In the two days after the announcement, stock prices have dropped and the price of risk has risen, as investors reassess the economy and markets:

The implied equity risk premium has risen from 4.57% on April 2  to 5.08% by the close of trading on Friday. The road ahead of us is long, but I plan to continue to compute these implied equity risk premiums every day for as long as I believe we are in crisis-mode, and I will keep these updated numbers on my webpage. As stocks have been revalued with higher prices of risk, that same uncertainty is playing out in the corporate bond market, where corporate default spreads widened on Thursday (April 3) and Friday (April 4):


As with the equity risk premiums, the price of risk in the bond market had already risen between the start of 2025 and March 28, 2025, but they surged last week, with the lowest ratings showing the biggest surges. With treasury rates, equity risk premiums and default spreads all on the move it may be time for companies and investors to be reassessing their costs of equity and capital. 

What now?

    If you have stayed with me so far on this long and rambling discourse, you are probably looking for my views on how this crisis will unfold, and how investors should respond now. I am afraid that dishing out investment advice is not my cup of tea, but I will try to explain how I plan to deal with what's coming, with the caveat that what I do may not work for you

A (Personal) Postscript 

    In the midst of every market meltdown, you will see three groups of experts emerge. The first will be the "I told you so" group, eager to tell you that this is the big one, the threat that they have spent a decade or more warning you about. They will of course not let on that if you had followed their advice from inception, you would have been invested in cash for the last decade, and even with a market crash, you would not be made hold again. The second will include "knee jerk contrarians", arguing that stock markets always come back, and that every market dip is a buying opportunity, an extraordinarily lazy philosophy that gets the rewards (none) that its deserves. The third will be the "indecisives", who will present every side of the argument, conclude that there is too much uncertainty right now to either buy or sell, but to wait until the uncertainty passes. There are elements of truth in all three arguments, but they all have blind spots.

    In the midst of a crisis, the market becomes a pricing game, where perception gets the better of reality, momentum overwhelms fundamentals and day-to-day movements cannot be rationalized. Anyone who tells you that their crystal balls, data or charts can predict what's coming is lying or delusional, and there is no one right response to this (or any other) crisis. It will depend on:

  1. Cash needs and time horizon: If you are or will soon be in need of cash, to pay for health care, buy a home or pay tuition, and you are invested in equities, you should take the cash out now. Waiting for a better time to do so, when the clock is ticking is the equivalent of paying Russian Roulette and just as dangerous. Conversely, if you do not need the cash and are patient, you have the flexibility of waiting, though having a longer time horizon does not necessarily mean that you should wait to act.
  2. Macro views: The effects on markets and the real economy will depend on how you see the tariffs playing out, with the outcomes ranging from a no-holds-barred trade war (with tariffs and counter tariffs) to a partial trade war (with some countries capitulating and others fighting) to a complete clearing of the air (where the tariff threat is scaled down or put on the back burner). While you may be inclined to turn this over to macro economists, this is less about economics and more about game theory, where an expert poker player will be better positioned to forecast what will happen than an economic think tank.
  3. Investment philosophy: I have long argued (and teach a class to that effect) that every investor needs an investment philosophy, attuned to his or her personal make up. That philosophy starts with a set of beliefs about how markets make mistakes and corrects them, and manifests in strategies designed to take advantage of those mistakes. 

My investment philosophy starts with the belief that markets, for the most part, do a remarkable job in aggregating and reflecting crowd consensus, but that they sometimes make big  mistakes that take long periods to correct, especially in periods and portions of the market where there is uncertainty.  I am terrible at gauging market mood and momentum, but feel that I have an edge (albeit a small one) in assessing individual companies, though that may be my delusion. My response to this crisis (or any other) will follow this script:

  1. Daily ERP: As in prior crises, I will continue to monitor the equity risk premiums, treasury rates and the expected return on stocks every day until I feel comfortable enough to let go. Note that this process lasted for months after the 2008 and 2020 crises, but as earnings updates for the S&P 500 reflect tariffs, my confidence in my assessments will increase. (As mentioned earlier, you will find these daily updates at this link)
  2. Revalue companies in my portfolio: While I was comfortable with the companies in my portfolio on March 28, viewing them as under valued or at least not over valued enough to merit a sell, the tariffs may have an significant effect on their values, and I plan to revalue them in batches, starting with my big tech holdings (the Mag Five, since I did sell Tesla and most of my Nvidia holdings) and working through the rest. 
  3. Buy value: I have drawn a contrast between great companies and great investments, with the former characterized by large moats, great management and strong earnings power, and the latter by being priced too low. There are companies that I believe are great companies, but are priced so highly by the market that they are sub-standard investments and I choose not to invest in them. During a crisis, where investors often sell without discrimination, there companies can become buys, and I have to be ready to buy at the right price. Since buying in the face of a market meltdown can require fortitude that I may not have, I have been scouring my list of great companies, revaluing them with the tariff effects built in, and putting buys at limit prices below those values. In the last week, both BYD, a company that I said that I liked, a few weeks ago in my post on globalization and disruption, and Mercado Libre, a Latin American powerhouse, that has the disruptive potential of an Amazon combined with a fintech enterprise, have moved from being significantly overvalued to within shouting distance of the limit prices I have on them. 
  4. Go back to living: I certainly don't see much gain watching the market hour-to-hour and day-to-day, since its doings are out of my control and anything that I do in response is more likely to do harm than good. Instead, I plan on living my life, enjoying life's small pleasures, like a Yankee win or taking my dog for a walk, to big ones, like celebrating my granddaughter's birthday in a couple of days. 
I hope that you find your own path back to serenity in the face of this market volatility, and that whatever you end up doing with your portfolio allows you to pass the sleep test, where you don't lie awake at night thinking about your portfolio (up or down). 

YouTube Video


Data Links