Tuesday, April 29, 2014

Watch the Gap: Apple's long and twisted pricing journey

Apple’s earnings call on April 23 contained some information about the company’s operations, but that news has largely been drowned out by other announcements that Apple made during that call; that it would increase dividends, add to its stock buyback program and split its stock. The market seems to like the bundle, with the stock up more than 13% from its close before the report. But what exactly did we learn about Apple in the report that we did not know already? Is the price rise merited? After the post-report price jump, is Apple fully priced? To address these questions, I am going to draw on some of my earlier posts on Apple and look for a narrative that may explain the market reaction.

Setting the stage: Price and value - Apple from December 2011 to April 2013
As some of you who have been reading this blog for a while know, I have a long standing obsession with all things to do with Apple. My first post on Apple was in January 2011, and it was focused on the narrow question of whether companies holding cash should be penalized for holding cash, and I argued otherwise. My next post in March 2012 commemorated two landmarks for Apple, its market capitalization exceeding $500 billion and its cash balance going over $100 billion. I valued Apple at about $700/share but conceded that I was biased both because I loved Apple products and had been a long-term holder of Apple stock. A month later, I got a fair amount of heat for selling my Apple stock at $600/share, though I continued to believe that its value was about $700/share, partly because of what readers viewed as an inconsistency. Value investors are supposed to continue to hold under valued stocks, not sell them. I rationalized my decision in that post and the next one, by presenting a theme that I have returned to several times since, which is that the pricing of a stock can be very different from its valuation and that when a stock becomes a momentum play, value will take a back seat to other factors.

Apple’s stock continued to surge in the months after, and in August 2012, I valued just the iPhone franchise, just ahead of the launch of the iPhone 5, just as the stock price crested at $700/share, ahead of that announcement. The market reacted negatively to early news about the iPhone 5, even though it was the most successful smartphone launch in history. My post in October 2012 was centered around how the expectations game for Apple had become skewed to the point that no achievement of the company would be good enough for a market that kept waiting for the next great blockbuster product. At the end of 2012, I revalued Apple, reflecting my downgraded assessments of Apple’s revenue growth and arrived at a value per share of $610/share, about 22% higher than the market price of $500/share at the time. A month later, with the stock at $450/share, I used Apple as a test of my faith in value and argued that my reaction to the market would be a good indicator of whether I was truly a value investor. In the days that followed, I also posted on what Apple could do in response to the pricing collapse and how investors could view and profit from the gap. 

In February 2013, David Einhorn made a push for Apple to return more cash to its stockholders. Though I disagreed with his plan to use preferred stock to monetize the under valuation,. I agreed with his argument that Apple should return more cash to its stockholders. In April 2013, I revalued Apple at about $590, after their earnings report, where they surprised markets by announcing both an increased stock buyback and their first debt issuance, well above the stock price of $420 at the time of the announcement. The stock continued to slide, hitting a low of $385/share in April. In September 2013, I posted on Apple in the context of separating your love for a company from your assessment of its stock as an investment, and revalued the stock at more than $600/share. The stock had recovered to $500/share by then, but it was still looked under valued to me.

Price and Value: Watch the gap!
Last week, I valued Apple at $675, just before the earnings report came out, using the information from the 2012-13 annual report (ending September 2013) and the first quarter report that came out in February 2014. Superimposing my twelve valuations across time for the company on a pricing graph, here is what I get:


In January 2011, the value that I obtained for Apple was $385 about 13% higher than the price as of that date ($339). Between January 2011 and July 2012, my intrinsic value estimates continued to climb to hit a peak of $686 in July 2012, reflecting primarily the success that Apple was showing in overcoming scale, i.e., managing to grow its revenues and maintain margins, in spite of its size. While the price initially lagged my estimate of value (with the under valuation increasing to 21% in September 2011), it surged thereafter closing the gap in July 2012. In September 2012, the stock price ($667) exceeded my value estimate ($639) for the first time during this period and that represented the pricing peak, as momentum shifted dramatically in the weeks after. The lower revenue growth and margin pressure also reduced my value estimate to $595 in April 2013, but the price dropped to $385 by April 2013 (creating a percentage under valuation of more than 25%). In the months, since there has been a slight uptick in my value estimates to $627 in January 2014 and about $675 in April, partly because of improvements in market mood (a lower equity risk premium) and partly because of reduced share count (due to Apple's buybacks). The price-value gap has closed a little since April 2013, albeit in fits and starts, with the gap standing at about 19.6% just before the last earnings report.

If you are interested in delving through the valuations in detail, I have posted all twelve valuations I have done of Apple since January 2011 at the end of this post.  If you are suspicious (and you should always should be) that I have back-fit the numbers, you can also check the valuations I posted in my blog in real time.

Apple's struggles with the gap
I understand that my valuations reflect my assumptions about the firm and Apple's managers may have very different views about the company. Whatever their perceptions, though, it seems quite clear to me that Apple's managers have believed that the market was undervaluing their stock though their reaction has evolved from an initial indifference to radical (and perhaps even desperate) action.

In the first few months, after the iPhone 5 launch, Apple seemed to operate on the conviction that the truth would prevail and that the market would come to its senses and reflect fundamentals. That conviction was tested in early 2013, partly by the continuing drop in the stock price and partly by activist investors (like David Einhorn and Carl Icahn) arguing that Apple should do something with its cash. In April 2013, Apple abandoned its do-nothing stand and announced, in conjunction with its earnings, that it would expand its stock buyback program and borrow money (about $17 billion). The initial market reaction was positive but it quickly faded. In the months since, Apple has tried to stay the course and talk the price up, to mixed effect.

The latest earnings report, on April 23, in many ways, reflects Apple's frustration with the persistent gap between price and value. It included almost every catalyst that companies that believe that they are under valued use to attack the gap between price and value: a dividend increase, an increase in the stock buyback program and a 7-for-1 stock split. The market reaction has been euphoric, as the stock price jumped from $525 before the report to $594 (as of today), which raises interesting questions about what investors saw in this report that made them reassess the price.
  1. There was little value effect: I revalued Apple, the day after the earnings report, and arrived at a value per share of $648, effectively unchanged from the $649 that I estimated on the day before. That may surprise you, but there was little in the earnings report that changes my view of Apple's operating future: it reported low revenue growth (5%) and continued pressure on margins. The stock buyback and dividends reflect how Apple plans to return cash to its stockholders and has no effect on operating asset value. The stock split is a purely cosmetic event, from a value perspective), since it just changes the number of units (shares) in the company.  (In just the last day or so, Apple has announced an additional $17 billion bond issue, which will have a increase the value per share by about $5/share).
  2. There was a price effect: While we can make the standard arguments for why the price changed after the report, i.e., that the dividends make investors feel more secure about future cash flows from their Apple stockholdings and that the stocky buybacks are a signal that the company believes that its stock is under valued, those arguments are undercut by the fact that Apple has tried both moves before, with little success in moving the pricing needle. In fact, it may be the stock splits, the one action that almost certainly has no value effect, that may have caused the mood shift. I know that one story that will make the rounds is that the stock split will allow investors who were hitherto unwilling or unable to buy the stock to be able to do so, thus expanding the investor base and improving liquidity. While that story may make sense for a lightly-traded, small cap company, I don't see it holding up to scrutiny when the company that in question is the largest company in the world. In fact, if it turns out (as some news stories are suggesting) that much of the price increase in the last four days has come from institutional holdings expanding, the liquidity argument becomes even weaker.
So, here is my explanation, for what its worth. There are lots of reasons for why a gap exists between price and value (as was the case with Apple) and why it persists for long periods but I believe that that the gap is largely driven by investor psychology and market momentum, two forces that are immune to rationality. That is also why it is difficult, if not impossible, for companies to devise plans to make price gaps go away, because these plans are generally based on the assumption that investors will react sensibly to them. If the reaction to the latest earnings report is the shift in momentum that Apple (and its activist investors) have been seeking for the last two years, it is ironic (but not unexpected) that it happened in response to the stock split, the least impactful of Apple's many tries during the period, and not to the more momentous events over that period (which included the launch of new products, acquisitions, buybacks, a debt issue and dividend increases).

What next
In my earliest posts on Apple, I argued that the company's success in the last decade and a few missteps, especially in the early part of 2011, had made it a magnet for stockholders of every type: growth, value and momentum. Consequently, the company had a stockholder base that it could never keep happy, since their views of its future (and what it should do with its cash) were contradictory. The last two years have been a painful adjustment process for all of these groups, and the stock price has reflected their turmoil. Growth investors in Apple have reluctantly come around to the point of view that Apple cannot keep growing its revenues at double-digit rates, value investors have found that the stock, in spite of the company's financial strength and profitability, continues to be volatile and momentum investors have discovered that momentum shifts are real and unpredictable. There are some in each group who have moved on to greener pastures and stocks better suited to their investment philosophies and Apple may be benefiting from this pruning of the base.

Given my estimate of value of $648/share, I will continue to hold Apple but I have learned to remain vigilant. If the institutional herd thunders back in, now that momentum looks like it is in Apple's favor, they may very well do what they did in the last iteration and drive the price right through the value (or at least my estimate of it). If my biggest problem as an investor is that the price of something I already hold may go up too much, I am blessed!

Update: I updated my April 2014 valuations to reflect the current share count of 861.38 million shares, rather that the weighted average share count of 885 million shares that I had used before. That pushes up the current estimate of value to $675/share.


Previous posts on Apple
  1. Apple: Thoughts on Bias, Value, Excess Cash & Dividends (March 1, 2012)
  2. Apple: Know when to hold 'em, know when to fold 'em (April 3, 2012)
  3. Emotions, Intrinsic value and Dividend Clienteles: The Apple postscript (April 6, 2012)
  4. Apple's Crown Jewel: Valuing the iPhone Franchise (August 29, 2012)
  5. Winning by Losing: The power of expectations (October 9, 2012)
  6. The Year in Review: Apple's Universe (December 27, 2012)
  7. Are you a value investor? Take the Apple test (January 27, 2013)
  8. Market Mayhem: Lessons for Apple (January 31, 2013)
  9. Back to Apple: Thoughts on value, price and the confidence gap (February 7, 2013)
  10. Financial Alchemy: David Einhorn's value play for Apple (February 8, 2013)
  11. Apple: News, Noise and Value (April 30, 2013)
  12. Love the company! Love the product! Love the stock! (September 9, 2013)
Valuations of Apple

Tuesday, March 25, 2014

Return to the firing line: Revisiting Tesla and hopefully living to tell the tale!



In September 2013, I valued Tesla on my blog at about $67 and learned a lesson about how passionate its stockholders were in defending it, viewing it less as an investment and more as a calling. I guess the lesson did not stick, because I am back for more punishment with an updated valuation of the company. Preempting some of the criticism that I may get for my post (and the views that it contains), I would like to put some basic facts on the table before I put down my valuation.
  • No, I don’t hate Tesla and Elon Musk. In fact, I think Tesla is one of the most innovative companies that I have seen emerge in a while and not only is it changing the automobile business, but it is doing so with style. As for Elon Musk, I wish that the CEOs of other companies were as passionate and visionary in promoting their companies' mission and products, as Musk is with Tesla.
  • No. I still have not driven a Tesla. I do live in New Jersey, a state that is attempting to use twentieth century regulations to stop a twenty-first century company. I also live five minutes away from Short Hills Mall, where Tesla just opened a showroom. So, I have seen the car, sat in it, but unless I want to create a disaster inside a mall, I don't think I can drive it out of the showroom.
  • No, I have not sold or plan to sell Tesla short. I also do not work for anyone who has sold short on Tesla, have not been paid (and will not be paid) for this post and won't be cheering if the stock retreats. In the interests of fairness, I do know one person who has sold short the company's shares with some success, but have not partaken in his profits.
  • No, I don’t believe that my valuation of Tesla is the "right" valuation of the company. It is mine, with my assumptions, estimates and views embedded in it, wrong or misguided though they might be. 
  • No, I don't think you are crazy, if you own or recently bought Tesla. I am a firm believer that each of us has to make our own judgments on what to invest in and why, though we all share the same end-objective, which is to make money on our investments. So, if you have good reasons to believe that Tesla is the right investment for you, I hope it works out for you.
Having dispensed with the formalities, let me move to substance. 

Valuation: Then and Now
In my September 2013 valuation of Tesla, I came up with a value per share of $67. At the time, the narrative I provided for the company was that giving it the revenues of Audi (about $65 billion) and the margins of Porsche (about 12.5%), in a decade, still yielded a value below the market price (about $170 in September 2013). Rather than rehash the assumptions I made in this post, you can find them in my original post. 

Since that valuation, there have been earnings reports that have contained substantial information about the growth trajectory and profitability of Tesla, as well as other news stories about the company, some positive (Consumer Report awards for its cars, the $5 billion investment in the world's largest electric battery factory) and some negative (Tesla car fires). All of these news stories provided information that led me to reassess some of the key inputs that I used in my valuation. 
  1. Revenue growth: Tesla continues on its path to higher revenues, reporting revenues of $615 million in the fourth quarter of 2013, doubling its revenues from the same quarter a year ago. The annual revenues in 2013 amounted to just over $2 billion, an almost five-fold increase over the $413 million in revenues in 2012. 
  2. Operating margin: In further good news, the operating losses (based upon GAAP) at the firm decreased over the period, down to -$13.4 million in the last quarter of 2013. In fact, adjusting for R&D expenses (capitalizing and amortizing), I estimate an operating profit of $15.46 million in the last quarter of 2013, vindicating the company’s claim that it turned the corner on profitability for the year (albeit with a very different rationalization). 
  3. Quality of Growth/Reinvestment: The measure that I used to estimate reinvestment and the quality of growth was the ratio of sales to invested capital. On this measure, as well, Tesla reported improvement in the last quarter of 2013 as the ratio improved from 0.66 in the third quarter to 0.87 in the fourth quarter; a dollar of invested capital generated $0.87 in revenue in the last quarter. (Higher values not this statistic indicate bigger payoffs to investment.)
  4. Risk: There are mixed signals in whether Tesla is getting less risky over time. The volatility in the stock price has actually increased over the last few months, as the stock first dropped on the news about car fires and then recovered quickly and decisively. However, the announcement that the company would raise $2 billion in convertible bonds is an indication that it is opening access in other markets and that will stand it in good stead, if it needs more capital to either grow or survive. 
The table below lists the key assumptions in my September 2013 valuation, the changes in the March 2014 valuation and my explanation for the changes.




September 2013 
March 2014
Rationale
Spreadsheet
See the gory details.
Base Revenues
$1,329 m
$2,014 m
Base Operating Income
-$22 m
-$17 m
Expected Revenue in year 10
$65,422 m
$79,215 m
Added revenues from the electric battery business to auto revenues.
Expected Operating Margin in year 10

12.50%
12.00%
Battery margins are likely to be lower (competitive business), pushing down the target margin.
Expected Operating Income in year 10
$8,178 m
$9,505 m
Comes through from higher revenues.
Sales/Invested Capital ratio (to compute reinvestment)
1.41
1.55
Reflects improvement in last quarter of 2014.
Cost of capital
10.03%
8.86%
Decline in market ERP from 5.8% in 9/13 to 5% in 3/14. Increase in auto sales led to make it slightly more automobile (60% to 70%) and slightly less technology (40% to 30%).
Probability of failure (Proceeds from failure)
10% (50% of estimated value)
0%
Increased access to capital (bond market), lower losses and larger market capitalization should allow company to survive even major shocks.
Value of equity
$8,152 m
$16,681 m
Increase of 105% in nine months.
Value per share
$67.12
$99.85/ $118.47
The value per share is lower ($100), if options get exercised at current price or close to it, and higher ($118), if option-holders wait and value converges on price.

Note that while the increase in year 10 revenues of $13.8 billion, largely the effect of increased revenue potential from the electric battery market, is substantial, it falls short of what you would expect to see if this were a ‘disruption” of the electric utility market. The improvement in margins in 2013 is encouraging, but they are in line with the expectations built into the September 2013 valuation, and entering the electric battery market is likely to lead to lower margins, not increase them. (The pre-tax operating margin for global electronics companies is 5.67% and that of power companies globally is 11.62%; neither is a perfect fit but you can download the industry average margins by clicking here). The decline in the cost of capital is more the consequence of change in the overall market environment, where the rise in overall stock prices in the last few months, has lowered the equity risk premium. Tesla’s foray into the bond market, with its $2 billion convertible bond issue, suggests that the company has opened up access to more capital, if it needs it, and shows up in the setting up of the probability of failure at 0%. 

Overall, the effects of these changes is to increase the value of equity by about 105%. The effect on the value per share is smaller, largely because the company has 22.64 million options outstanding in addition to its 123.19 million shares outstanding. If we value these options, using the current stock price as the basis, we obtain a value per share of $100, but using the estimated value per share (I know.. I know.. there is circularity and that is why the excel spreadsheet is set to iterate) yields a value per share of $ 118. The danger with using the latter approach is that the option holders, assuming that they see what we see in this valuation, will be inclined to exercise when the price is high. Splitting the difference, the value per share estimate that I would attach to Tesla is between $110 and $115 per share. 

Can the intrinsic value per share of a company close to double within a nine- month period? Yes, and with young growth companies, you should expect your estimates of value to be volatile over time, as you learn more (good and bad) about the company and its business. Does it bother me that value is so volatile? No, because it is not how volatile the value is, but how volatile it is, relative to price, that drives investment decisions. This is after all a company whose stock price has quadrupled, halved and doubled again all in the period of two years. 


Price and Value
Tesla is a perfect case study for the dilemma that I posed for “value” investors in my post on buzz words, where you reject a stock as over valued, only to see the stock price increase even further. In September 2013, I valued Tesla at $67, when the stock price was $170, and concluded that it was over valued. Nine months later, the stock has gone up to $220, and even with my more optimistic outlook on the company, I have a value of $115-120, well below the market price. The trader ranks beckon, but as an investor, I have three choices with Tesla:

1. Delusion: Do a quasi DCF!
There is widely held presumption that if you have a set of cash flows on a spreadsheet, and you estimate a discount rate, you have done a DCF, which is the equivalent of  claiming that wearing tights and ballet shoes makes you a ballerina. There are simple tests you can run to differentiate between good, bad and indifferent DCFs (and I will have a post dedicated to that topic), but in the context of Tesla, there are tweaks I can make to the model that can very quickly alter my value. For instance, if I set the sales to capital ratio at 10.0 (i.e,, that I can generate $10 of revenues for every dollar invested), the value per share goes to $302/share. Magical, right? The only problem is that I would then be assuming that Tesla will generate about $68 billion in incremental revenues and $9 billion in incremental profits, over the next decade, without building any factories or making acquisitions. Unless Tesla has discovered a way to build cars and batteries on virtual assembly lines, manned by Oompa Loompas, I don't see a way to justify this. In fact, Tesla's announcement that it would be investing $5 billion in its new electric battery factory suggests that the company knows that it has to make substantial infrastructure investments over the next decade, to deliver its growth potential.

2. Disruption and China: Attaching value to buzzwords
The last earnings report from Tesla was followed by the announcements that the company would start selling its cars in China and that it would be building a gigafactory to produce electric batteries. If you were working on a checklist for buzzwords, you would have hit the trifecta with this announcement: a company with growth potential announcing that it would enter China and disrupt an existing business. These announcements have valuation implications, but they have to be made explicit, if they are to the taken seriously.

Take, for instance, the argument that the electric battery investment represents the entrée into the market for supplying electric power for other uses (homes, businesses etc.). If the argument holds, it could be a value-changer, since the electric utility market is an immense one, in terms of revenues, albeit with much lower returns on capital. For disruption to justify today's stock price, the change in revenues will have to be far larger than the estimates in my valuation. If you believe that Tesla has the capacity to disrupt the electric utility business, the table below should give you a sense of the break-even points (to justify a $220 stock price):

There are a couple of interesting details in this table. The first is that while there is tremendous upside potential, the break even points to get to a $220 value are daunting. If the pre-tax operating margin converges on 12% (as assumed in my base case), you would need total revenues of more than $150 billion to justify the current market price. In other words, your battery business will have to add about $90 billion to Tesla's annual revenues by the tenth year. If margins drop, the current market value is not only unreachable, but growth can become a value destroyer. For instance, with a 4% operating margin, given the reinvestment needs in these businesses, increasing growth makes your value become more negative. If you buy into the disruption model, the challenge then becomes determining how much that disruption will create in additional revenues (in the electric utility business) without damaging profit margins. It is worth noting that Tesla is not the only player in this disruption game, with Honda having already jumped into the fray (albeit with their smaller and less powerful electric batteries) and Hyundai and Toyota getting ready to enter. 

There is also the possibility that there are companies that would be interested in either acquiring Tesla (a tough task, since Elon Musk has been insistent that he will not sell) or partnering with it to create value on joint products. Given Tesla's burgeoning market capitalization, the list of potential acquirers/ JV partners does get smaller, but it is possible that the promise of a Google/Tesla driverless car could tempt Google to invest some of its substantial cash balance in Tesla. 

3. Keep the faith
My investment philosophy is built on the foundation that you should buy an asset only if trades at a price less than your estimated value for that asset, error-prone and uncertain though the latter may be. It is true that I can offer no proof that my value is right, that the price is wrong or even if the first two assertions are true (right value, wrong price), that the price will adjust to the value, but is that not the essence of faith? That you believe, without proof! If I stay true to my philosophy, I cannot justify buying Tesla at the current price. Of course, a year from now, the stock may be at $400, but I will have no regrets, because I also believe that if you don't stand for something, you will fall for anything. 

Your philosophy on investing may be different from mine, and probably better (or at least more lucrative). If you are a Tesla stockholder, though, I hope that you are one for the right reasons. That would include being a trader (whose focus is price, not value), buying into the disruption model or investing on the expectation of an acquisition, but it would not include investing because others have been making money on the stock, equity research analysts are bullish or just because you love the company, its products or its CEO.

Thoughts on markets
It is easy to become cynical about markets and to cast those who have different views than you do into the "irrational" or "crazy" camp. Even if the Tesla run-up turns out to be overdone, look at the bigger picture, which is that a company that was non-existent five years ago has shaken up a sector where there have been no new entrants for decades. I have nothing but admiration for what Elon Musk has built over these few years and I hope he succeeds. In fact, I will keep valuing Tesla, every few months, and there will be a time, sooner rather than later, where I know it will be part of my portfolio. Just not yet!

Note: If you don't like my assumptions or inputs, use the valuation spreadsheet below, change my assumptions to yours and make it your valuation. If you are so inclined, share your views in the Google shared spreadsheet that I created for this valuation.

Additional links