Showing posts with label Dividends and cash balances. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dividends and cash balances. Show all posts

Tuesday, February 24, 2026

Data Update 8 for 2026: Time for Harvesting - Dividends and Buybacks

    In the data update posts this year, I have wended my way from the macro (equities collectives, the bond market and other asset classes) to the micro, starting with hurdle rates and returns in posts five and six and the debt/equity choice in my seventh post. In this post, I will look at the decision by businesses on how much cash to return to their owners, and in what form (dividends or buybacks), and how that decision played out globally in 2025. I will argue that dividend policy, more than any other aspect of corporate finance, is dysfunctional both for the firms that choose to return the cash and the investors who receive that cash. It is also telling that there are many who seem to view the very act of returning cash as a sign of failure on the part of firms that do so, even though it is the end game for every successful business.

The Dividend Decision

    I start my corporate finance classes with a description of three core decisions that every firm has to make in the course of business, starting with the investment decision, where you try to invest in projects and investments that earn more than your hurdle rate, moving on to the financing decision, where you decide on the mix of debt and equity to use in funding those investments, and ending with the dividend decision, where firms decide how much cash to return to their owners. In the case of privately owned businesses, this cash can be withdrawn by the owners from the business, but in publicly listed companies, it takes the form of dividends or buybacks. In keeping with the notion that these are the cashflows to equity investors, and that those cash flows should represent what is left after (residual) after all other needs have been met, dividends should reflect that status and, at least in principle, be set after investing and financing decisions have been made:

That utopian view of residual cash being returned to shareholders is put to the test by two real-world realities that often govern corporate dividend policy:

  1. Inertia: In many companies, dividend policy is set on auto pilot, with dividends this year set equal to dividends in the last year. It is for that reason that the word I would use to describe dividend policy, at least when it comes to conventional dividends, is 'sticky', and you can can see that stickiness at play at US companies, if you track the percentage of companies that increase dividends, decrease dividends or leave them unchanged every year.

    In every single year, from 1988 to 2025, the percentage of companies that pay the same dividends that they did in the previous year outnumbers companies that change dividends, and when dividends are changed, they are more likely to be increased than decreased.
  2. Me-tooism: In most companies, managers look to peer group dividend policy for guidance on how much, if any, to pay in dividends. Thus, if you are a bank or a utility, it is likely that you will pay high dividends, because everyone else in the sector does so, whereas technology companies will pay no or low dividends, because that is industry practice. While there are good reasons why some industry groups pay more dividends than others, including more predictable earnings and lower growth (and investment needs), hewing to the peer group implies that there will be outliers in each group (fast-growing banks or a mature technology companies) that will be trapped into dividend policies that don't suit them.

When maintaining or increasing dividends become the end game for a business, you unleash dividend monsters, where investing and financing decisions are skewed to meet dividend needs. Thus, a firm may turn away good investments or borrow much more than it should because it feels the need to sustain dividends. 

I have long argued that dividends, in their sticky form, are unsuitable as cash returns to shareholders, but for much of the last century, they remained the primary or often only way to return cash to shareholders. While buying back stock has always been an option available to US companies, its use as a systematic way of returning cash picked up in the 1980s, and in the years since, stock buybacks have become the dominant approach to returning cash for US companies:


As you can see, in the last decade, more than 60% of cash returned to shareholders took the form of buybacks. The primary reason, in my view, is that buybacks, unlike dividends, are flexible, with companies often reversing buybacks, if macro circumstances change, as was the case in 2008 and 2020. There are other reasons that have been offered for the explosive growth in buybacks, but none of them are as significant. There are some who have argued it is stock-based compensation for managers that is pushing them away from dividends to stock buybacks, but that rationale makes more sense for stock options, where stock prices mater, than for restricted stock. In fact, even as more companies shift to restricted stock as their stock compensation mechanism, buybacks have continued to climb, and they are just as high at companies that have no or very low stock based compensation as at companies with high stock-based compensation. Investor taxes are alway in the mix, since investors are often taxed at different rates on dividends and capital gains, but changes in tax law in the last two decades have reduced, if not eliminated, the tax disadvantages associated with dividends, cutting against this argument. 
    I know that there are many investors, especially in the value investing camp, and quite a few economists, who believe that the shift away from dividends to buybacks is unhealthy, albeit for different reasons. I will return to many of the myths that revolve around buybacks later in this post.

A Rational Cash Return Policy

    If you were designing a sensible cash return policy, it has to start with an assessment of how much cash there is available for a firm to return. Since that "potential dividend" should be the cash left over after taxes are paid, reinvestment has been made and debt repaid, it can be computed fairly simply from the statement of cash flows, as free cashflow to equity:


Note that free cash flow to equity starts with equity earnings, converts those earnings to cash flows by adding back depreciation and other non-cash charges, and then netting out capital expenditures and changes in working capital, with increases (decreases) in working capital reducing (increasing) cash flows. It is completed by incorporating the cash flows from debt, with debt issuances representing cash inflows to equity investors and debt repayments becoming cash outflows. Can free cash flows to equity be negative? Absolutely, and it can happen either because you are a money-losing company, too deep in the hole to dig yourself out, or even a money-making companies, with large reinvestment needs? Obviously, paying out dividends or buying back stock when your free cash flows to equity is violating the simple rule that if you are in a hole, you need to stop digging.

    If your free cash flow to equity is positive, you can choose to return it to shareholders, either in the form of dividends or buybacks, but you are not obligated to do so. In fact, if you have positive free cashflows to equity and you choose to return none or only a portion of that cash flow, the difference accumulates into a cash balance. If you choose to return more than your free cashflow to equity, you will either have to deplete an existing cash balance, or if you run out of cash, go out and raise fresh capital.

A company that systematically holds back on cash that it could have returned will, over time, accumulate a large cash balance, but that, by itself, may not trigger a shareholder response, if shareholders trust the company's managers with their cash. After all, cash invested in liquid and riskless investments, like treasury bills and commercial paper, is a neutral (zero NPV) investment, and leaves shareholders unaffected. If you don't trust management to be disciplined, though, you may punish a company for holding too much cash, effectively apply a "lack-of-trust" discount to the cash. The picture below provides a framework for thinking through the cash return decision, and how it will play out in markets.

As you look at the interplay between earnings, investment needs and potential dividends, you can already see why you should expect cash return policies to change over a company's life cycle:


The cash returns you see in this graph should largely map on to common sense, with start-ups and very young companies, often money-losing and requiring substantial reinvestment to grow, having negative free cash flow to equity (thus requiring equity infusions). Young growth companies  are usually self-funding because internal cash flows may rise to cover reinvestment, but these cash flows are not enough to pay dividends. Mature growth companies have enough cash to return, but stick with buybacks, because they value flexibility. Mature stable companies represent the sweet spot for dividend paying, since they have little in reinvestment needs and large predictable earnings and cash flows. As with everything else in the aging process, companies that refuse to act their age, i.e., young companies that choose to pay dividends or buy back stock or mature companies that insist on holding on to cash, damage themselves and their shareholders.

Dividends in 2025

   I will start the assessment of how much companies returned to shareholders in 2025 by looking at conventional dividends paid by companies, using two metrics. The first metric is the dividend payout ratio, where I divide dividends paid by net income, but only if net income is positive; if net income is negative, and dividends get paid, the payout ratio is not meaningful:


As you can see the median payout ratio is about 35% (59%) for US (global) companies, but in both samples, most companies do not pay dividends. There is a sizable subset of companies (12% of US and 14% of global companies) that pay out more than 100% of earnings as dividends, with multiple reasons for that oversized number including a bad earnings year, a desire to increase financial leverage and partial liquidation plans all coming into play.

    The second metric is the dividend yield, computed by dividing dividends paid by market capitalization, or dividends per share by the market price per share. In the graph below, I look at the distribution of dividend yields across companies in the graph below, in 2025:


Again looking at only dividend paying firms in the US and global samples, the median dividend yield was 1.10% for the former and 2.43% for the latter, with major divergences across sub-regions; note that the percent of dividend paying firms  in the United States has dropped below 30% and even globally, less than half of firms pay dividends. The dividend yield ties into the cost of equity discussion that I initiated in my fifth data update, where I described the cost of equity as the rate of return that investors expect to make on their equity investments. In the United States, for instance, that expected return was about 8.50% at the start of 2026, which would indicate that if you are an equity investor, it is price appreciation that you are dependent on, for the bulk of your equity return.
    The dividend yield for equities has declined over time, with the drop off being most noticeable in the United States. The graph below looks at the dividend yield on the S&P 500 from 1960 to 2025, and how that number has become a smaller and smaller portion of the overall expected return on stocks (which I compute with the implied equity return approach):

In 1960, about half of your expected return on stocks came from dividends and that statistic has trended downwards for the last few decades, and in 2025, it represented less than 15% of the total return on stocks. 
    As a final part of this analysis, I looked at dividend yields and payout ratios, broken down by sector, for both US and global companies:

As you can see, the sectors with the highest percentage of firms paying dividends are financials, real estate and utilities, for both US and global companies, and consumer product companies join in that group, for global companies. In terms of payout ratios, the same three sectors dominate, with energy and real estate returning more than 200% of net income as dividends, in 2025, and posting dividend yields in excess of 6%. Technology companies and communication services have the lowest percent of dividend paying companies and the lowest dividend yields and payout ratios.

    The drop in dividend yields over time for the market, the decline in dividend paying firms and the concentration of dividend paying firms in some sectors has put old time value investing to the test. Ben Graham's strategy of principal protection was built around buying large dividend paying firms and holding on for the long term and it has hit a wall. Any investing strategy built around dividends will result in a portfolio composed of mature and declining firms, and even if you accept that reality, those firms are increasingly concentrated in real estate, banking and utilities. 

Buybacks - Myths and Realities
    As buybacks have soared in the United States, misconceptions and myths about buybacks have also surged, with some myths used to back up the argument that buybacks are unhealthy and should therefore be banned and others presented as the basis for buybacks as good, representing cannot-lose strategies to beat  the market. I will start with the myths that are used to argue against buybacks first, before moving on to those that are used to justify it:

1. Myths in favor of the argument that buybacks are bad and should be restricted or stopped
Myth 1.1: Buybacks are a US phenomenon
Reality 1.1: Buybacks are becoming a global phenomenon
    When US firms first started buying back stock in the 1980s, it is true that is was almost entirely or primarily a phenomenon restricted to the US, with large parts of the world restricting or banning the use of buybacks to prevent price manipulation by companies. That is no longer the case, and companies around the world have taken to buybacks, as a flexible alternative to dividends, have adopted the practice. In 2025, I looked at dividends and buybacks from companies around the world:

Companies in the United States are still in the lead in the buyback race, buying back $1.153 trillion in stock in 2025, close to 60% of overall cash returned. Canada, the UK, and Japan are not far behind with more than 35% of cash returned taking the form of buybacks, and the EU and environs, often the slowest to adapt to change, saw almost 29% of cash returned in buybacks. For a variety of reasons, including poor corporate governance and regulatory restrictions, Africa & the Middle East, Eastern Europe and much of south and southeast Asia return relatively little in buybacks.

Myth 1.2: Buybacks are wasteful and reduce corporate investment
Reality 1.2: Buybacks redirect corporate investment from mature companies to growth businesses
    The argument that buybacks are wasteful often come from using a firm as a self-contained economic unit, and noting that money used on buybacks cannot be reinvested back into the firm. That is absolutely true, but the cash that goes into buybacks goes to investors and mostly goes back into the market, as investments in other companies. While there are clearly exceptions, where companies that should be investing back into their businesses use that cash to buyback stock, the companies that are the biggest buyers of their own stock are mature firms with insufficient investment opportunities and the companies that have the cash redirected into them need that cash to fund their growth. You can see this play out, when you look at stock buybacks broken down, by age decile (based upon corporate age) for US and global companies:


As you can see, younger companies are not only less likely to buy back stock, but also return less cash in dividends and buybacks, at least as a percent of market capitalization than older companies. Using the life cycle perspective, this suggests that cash is rotating out of older, more mature businesses into younger businesses. I would argue that the difference between geographies where buybacks are rare and geographies where buybacks are common is not in how much corporate investment there is, but in where that investment is directed, with the former investing investing back into declining businesses and the latter funding higher growth and newer businesses.

Myth 1.3: Buybacks are funded with debt are are making companies too highly levered
Reality 1.3: Buybacks are primarily funded with free cash flows to equity and even as buybacks have surged, debt ratios have decreased.
    I am not a great believer in case studies precisely because anecdotal evidence is spun into backing priors and preconception.s There are, of course, firms that have dug themselves into a hole by buying back immense amounts of stock, and funding those buybacks with debt, but the aggregate debt ratios for US non-financial service firms, with debt to capital ratios measured against both book and market, have declined over the last four decades, even as buybacks have surged. 

If your response is that not all companies buy back stock, and that debt ratios has risen at companies that buy back stock, a comparison of debt ratios (debt to EBITDA and debt to capital) for US firms that bought back stock in 2025 versus those that do not dispels that argument:

If firms are borrowing money to fund buybacks, it is clearly not showing up in the statistics, since companies that bought back stock had much lower debt loads than the companies that did not, a simplistic comparison, but one that carries heft.

Myth 1.4: Buybacks are value-destroying because companies tend to buy back their own stock when prices are too high
Reality 1.4: Buybacks, at any price, can neither add nor destroy value. They can just transfer value
    Warren Buffett was late to the buyback party, but when he initiated buybacks at Berkshire Hathaway, he introduced a constraint, which is that he would do buybacks only if he believed that the company's stock price was less than intrinsic value. He, of course, had the credibility to make this assertion, but most companies don't impose this constraint and there is evidence that they often buy back their shares when stock prices are higher than they are lower. That does seem like value destruction, but a cash return can neither add nor destroy value, but it can transfer wealth. In the case of stock buybacks at too high a price, wealth is transferred from those who remain loyal shareholders in the firm to those who sell their shares. While there is hand wringing about this, you have a choice, as a shareholder, in a buyback, to sell or hold on, and if you believe that the buyback is at too high a price, you should sell your shares back.

2. Myths in favor of the argument that buybacks are good and generate excess returns for investors 
Myth 2.1: Buybacks are value-adding because companies that buy back their own stock when prices are lower than fair value are taking positive net present value investments.
Reality 2.1: Buybacks, at any price, can neither add nor destroy value. They can just transfer value.
    This is the inverse of the argument that buybacks are value destroying and they are both grounded in a misclassification of buybacks as projects, rather than cash return, competing with investment projects for the company's dollars. The truth again is that a stock that buys back stock at lower than fair value is transferring wealth from those who sell back to those who remain, and here again, if you are on the wrong side of wealth transfer, it was your choice to sell back that made you the loser. 

Myth 2.2:  Buybacks are almost always good for stock prices, since there are fewer shares outstanding after buybacks, and that should increase the price per share.
Reality 2.2: A buyback can increase, do nothing or decrease value per share, depending on the price at which it is done and its effects on leverage.
    Buybacks reduce share count (the denominator) but the cash that leaves the firm also reduces fir value (the numerator). A fair-value buyback will create offsetting effects, leaving value per share unchanged, though there can be a secondary effect on value, if the buyback, by reducing equity, changes the debt to capital mix and cost of capital for a company:
It is true that empirical evidence backs up the notion that stock prices benefit from buybacks, but that may be from the selection bias of under levered firms with large cash balances being the biggest players in the stock buyback game. 

In general, almost all of these myths come out of treating buybacks as something new and different, rather than a variant on dividends. In general, companies that should not be paying dividends, either because they lack the cash or the future is uncertain, should not be buying back stock either. 

Dividend Dysfunction

    At the start of this post, I noted that dividend policy is dysfunctional at many firms, driven by inertia (we've always paid dividends or we've never paid dividend before) and the desire to hew to peer group policies. As a result, there are many companies around the world that adopt dividend policies that, at least of the face of it, take explaining including:

  1. Money-losing companies that pay dividends: While there are some companies that offer justifications grounded in worries about sending bad signals or hopes of a bounce back in earnings, many get stuck with dividend policies, because of inertia or peer group pressure, that can drive them into ruin.
  2. Money-making companies that refuse to pay dividends: Here again, there can be good reasons for holding back including concerns about whether you can sustain earning and expectations that you will need to invest more in the future, but in some cases, it can unwillingness to initiate dividends in an industry where no one else pays dividends.
  3. Negative FCFE companies that return cash (dividends or buybacks): In addition to hopes for a bounce back in FCFE, companies may continue to return cash, even with negative FCFE, because they are trying to increase debt ratios or shrink their businesses over time. 
  4. Positive FCFE companies that return no cash: Companies that have positive FCFE that don't return cash may hold back that cash because of the desire to reduce debt ratios or because they ahve investment plans.
The graph below lists out the number of companies in each group, broken down by geography:


Across the globe in 2025, almost 18% of money-losing companies paid dividends, as did about 70% of money-making companies. With FCFE as your indicator, about 37% of companies that returned cash (in dividends and buybacks) in 2025, had negative FCFE, as did 66% of companies with positive FCFE.

Conclusion

    There are a whole host of misalignments between what companies return to their shareholders, either as dividends or in buybacks, and what they can, as potential dividends. That suggests to me, and perhaps I am wrong, that investment strategies that are built around cash return, whether they be dividends or buybacks, are likely to go off the tracks. Furthermore, any strategy that is built entirely around dividends, as is the case with strategies where you load up on high dividend yield stocks or buy a handful of heavy dividend payers, such as the Dogs of the Dow, misses the essence of equity investing. A stock is not a bond, where dividends replace coupons, and you get some price appreciation on top, and treating it as such will only create disappointment.

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Data links

  1. Dividend statistics, by industry (US and Global)
  2. Buyback statistics, by industry (US and Global)
  3. Dividends and Buybacks - History for US firms

Spreadsheets

  1. Buyback stock price calculator

Data Update Posts for 2026

  1. Data Update 1 for 2026: The Push and Pull of Data
  2. Data Update 2 for 2026: Equities get tested and pass again!
  3. Data Update 3 for 2026: The Trust Deficit - Bonds, Currencies, Gold and Bitcoin!
  4. Data Update 4 for 2026: The Global Perspective
  5. Data Update 5 for 2026: Risk and Hurdle Rates
  6. Data Update 6 for 2026: In Search of Profitability
  7. Data Update 7 for 2026: Debt and Taxes
  8. Data Update 8 for 2026: Dividends and Buybacks

Friday, July 18, 2025

To Bitcoin or not to Bitcoin? A Corporate Cash Question!

    In this post, I will bring together two disparate and very different topics that I have written about in the past. The first is the role that cash holdings play in a business, an extension of the dividend policy question, with an examination of why businesses often should not pay out what they have available to shareholders. In my classes and writing on corporate finance, I look at the motives for businesses retaining cash, as well as how much cash is too much cash. The second is bitcoin, which can be viewed as either a currency or a collectible, and in a series of posts, I argued that bitcoin can only be priced, not valued, making debates about whether to buy or not to buy entirely a function of perception. In fact, I have steered away from saying much about bitcoin in recent years, though I did mention it in my post on alternative investments as a collectible (like gold) that can be added to the choice mix. While there may be little that seemingly connects the two topics (cash and bitcoin), I was drawn to write this post because of a debate that seems to be heating up on whether companies should put some or a large portion of their cash balances into bitcoin, with the success of MicroStrategy, a high-profile beneficiary of this action, driving some of this push. I believe that it is a terrible idea for most companies, and before Bitcoin believers get riled up, my reasoning has absolutely nothing to do with what I think of bitcoin as an investment and more to do with how little I trust corporate managers to time trades right. That said, I do see a small subset of companies, where the holding bitcoin strategy makes sense, as long as there are guardrails on disclosure and governance.

Cash in a Going Concern

    In a world where businesses can raise capital (equity or debt) at fair prices and in a timely manner, there is little need to hold cash, but that is not the world we live in. For a variety of reasons, some internal and some external, companies are often unable or unwilling to raise capital from markets, and with that constraint in place, it is logical to hold cash to meet unforeseen needs. In this section, I will start by laying out the role that cash holdings play in any business, and examine how much cash is held by companies, broken down by groupings (regional, size, industry). 

A Financial Balance Sheet

    To understand the place of cash in a business, I will start with a  financial balance sheet, a structure for breaking down a business, public or private:

On the asset side of the balance sheet, you start with the operating business or businesses that a company is in, with a bifurcation of value into value from investments already made (assets-in-place) and value from investments that the company expects to make in the future (growth assets). The second asset grouping, non-operating assets, includes a range of investments that a company may make, sometimes to augment its core businesses (strategic investments), and sometimes as side investments, and thus include minority holdings in other companies (cross holdings) and even investments in financial assets. Sometimes, as is the case with family group companies, these cross holdings may be a reflection of the company's history as part of the group, with investments in other group companies for either capital or corporate control reasons. The third grouping is for cash and marketable securities, and this is meant specifically for investments that share two common characteristics - they are riskless or close to riskless insofar as holding their value over time and they are liquid in the sense that they can be converted to cash quickly and with no penalty. For most companies, this has meant investing cash in short-term bonds or bills, issued by either governments (assuming that they have little default risk) or by large, safe companies (in the form of commercial paper issued by highly rated firms). 

    Note that there are two sources of capital for any business, debt or equity, and in assessing how levered a firm is, investors look at the proportion of the capital that comes from each:

  • Debt to Equity = Debt/ Equity
  • Debt to Capital = Debt/ (Debt + Equity)

In fact, there are many analysts and investors who estimate these debt ratios, using net debt, where they net the cash holdings of a company against the debt, with the rationale, merited or not, that cash can be used to pay down debt.

  • Net Debt to Equity = (Debt-Cash)/ Equity
  • Debt to Capital = (Debt-Cash)/ (Debt + Equity)
All of these ratios can be computed using accounting book value numbers for debt and equity or with market value numbers for both. 

The Motives for holding Cash

    In my introductory finance classes, there was little discussion of cash holdings in companies, outside of the sessions on working capital. In those sessions, cash was introduced as a lubricant for businesses, necessary for day-to-day operations. Thus, a retail store that had scores of cash customers, it was argued, needed to hold more cash, often in the form of currency, to meet its transactional needs, than a company with corporate suppliers and business customers, with predictable patterns in operations. In fact, there were rules of thumb that were developed on how much cash a company needed to have for its operations. As the world shifts away from cash to digital and online payments, this need for cash has decreased, but clearly not disappeared. The one carve out is the financial services sector, where the nature of the business (banking, trading, brokerage) requires companies in the sector to hold cash and marketable securities as part of their operating businesses.

    If the only reason for holding cash was to cover operating needs, there would be no way to justify the tens of billions of dollars that many companies hold; Apple alone has often had cash balances that exceeded $200 billion, and the other tech giants are not far behind. For some companies, at least, the rationale for holding far more cash than justified by their operating needs is that it can operate as a shock absorber, something that they can fall back on during periods of crisis or to cover unexpected expenses. That is the reason that cyclical and commodity firms have often offered for holding large cash balances (as a percent of their overall firm value), since a recession or a commodity price downturn can quickly turn profits to losses.

   Using the corporate life cycle structure can also provide insight into how the motives for holding cash can change as a company ages.  

For start-ups, that are either pre-revenue or have very low revenues, cash is needed to keep the business operating, since employees have to be paid and expenses covered. Young firms that are money-losing and with large negative cash flows, hold cash to cover future cash flow needs and to fend off the risk of failure. In effect, these firms are using cash as life preservers, where they can make it through periods where external capital (venture capital, in particular) dries up, without having to sell their growth potential at bargain basement prices. As firms start to make money, and enter high growth, cash has use as a business scalar, for firms that want to scale up quickly. In mature growth, cash acquires optionality, useful in allowing the business to find new markets for its products or product extensions.  Mature firms sometimes hold cash as youth serum, hoping that  it can be used to make once-in-a-lifetime investments that may take them back to their growth days, and for declining firms, cash becomes a liquidation manager, allowing for the orderly repayment of debt and sale of assets.

    There is a final rationale for holding cash that is rooted in corporate governance and the control and power that comes from holding cash. I have long argued that absent pressure from shareholders, managers at most publicly traded firms would choose to return very little of the cash that they generate, since that cash balance not only makes them more sought after (by bankers and consultants who are endlessly inventive about uses that the cash can be put to) but also gives them the power to build corporate empires and create personal legacies.

Corporate Cash Holdings

    Given the multitude of reasons for holding cash, it should come as no surprise that publicly traded companies around the world have significant cash balances. Leading into July 2025, for instance, global non-financial-service firms held almost $11.4 trillion in cash and marketable securities; financial service firms held even more in cash and marketable securities, but those holdings, as we noted earlier, can represent their business needs. Using our earlier breakdown of the asset side of the balance sheet into cash, non-operating and operating assets, this is what non-financial service firms in the aggregate looked like in book value terms (global and just US firms):


Note that cash is about 11% of the book value of total assets, in the aggregate, for global firms, and about 9% of the book value of total assets, for US firms. Global firms do hold a higher percentage of their value in non-operating assets, but US firms are more active on the acquisition front, explaining why goodwill (which is triggered almost entirely by acquisitions) is greater at US firms.

    The typical publicly traded firm holds a large cash balance, but there are significant differences in cash holdings, by sector. In the table below, I look at cash as a percent of total assets, a book value measure, as well as cash as a percent of firm value, computed by aggregating market values:


As you can see, technology firms, which presumably face more uncertainty about their future hold far more cash as a percent of book value, but the value that the market attaches to their growth brings down cash as a percent of firm value. Utilities, regulated and often stable businesses, tend to hold the least cash, 
both in book and market terms. 

    Breaking down the sample by region, I look at cash holdings, as a percent of total assets and firms, across the globe:


The differences across the globe can be explained by a mix of market access, with countries in parts of the world where it can be difficult to access capital (Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa) holding more cash. In addition, and corporate governance, with cash holdings being greater in parts of the world (China, Russia) where shareholders have less power over managers. 

    Given the earlier discussion of how the motives for holding cash can vary across the life cycle, I broke the sample down by age decile, with age measured from the year of founding, and looked at cash holdings, by decile:


The results are mixed, with cash holdings as a percent of total assets being higher for the younger half of the sample (the top five deciles) than for the older half, but the is no discernible pattern, when cash is measured as a percent of firm value (market). Put simple, companies across the life cycle hold cash, though with different motives, with the youngest firms holding on to cash as lifesavers (and for survival) and the older firms keeping cash in the hopes that they can use it to rediscover their youth.

The Magic of Bitcoin

    I have been teaching and working with investments now for four decades, and there has been no investment that has received as much attention from both investors and the financial press, relative to its actual value, as has bitcoin. Some of the draw has come from its connections to the digital age, but much of it has come from its rapid rise in price that has made many rich, with intermittent collapses that have made just as many poor. I am a novice when it comes to crypto, and while I have been open about the fact that it is not my investment preference, I understand its draw, especially for younger investors.

The Short, Eventful History of Bitcoin

    The origin story for Bitcoin matters since it helps us understand both its appeal and its structure. It was born in November 2008, two months into one of the worst financial crises of the last century, with banks and governments viewed as largely responsible for the mess. Not surprisingly, Bitcoin was built on the presumption that you cannot trust these institutions, and its biggest innovation was the blockchain, designed as a way of crowd-checking transactions and preserving transaction integrity. I have long described Bitcoin as a currency designed by the paranoid for the paranoid, and I have never meant that as a critique, since in the  untrustworthy world that we live in, paranoia is a justifiable posture.

    From its humble beginnings, where only a few (mostly tech geeks) were aware of its existence, Bitcoin has accumulated evangelists, who argue that it is the currency of the future, and speculators who have used its wild price swings to make and lose tens of millions of dollars. In the chart below, I look at the price of bitcoin over the last decade, as its price has increased from less than $400 in September 2014 to more than $110,000 in June 2025:

Along the way, Bitcoin has also found some acceptance as a currency, first for illegal activities (drugs on the Silk Road) and then as the currency for countries with failed fiat currencies (like El Salvador), but even Bitcoin advocates will agree that its use in transactions (as the medium of exchange) has not kept pace with its growth as a speculative trade. 

Pricing Bitcoin

    In a post in 2017,  I divided investments into four groups - assets that generate cash flows (stocks, bonds, private businesses), commodities that can be used to produce other goods  (oil, iron ore etc), currencies that act as mediums of exchange and stores of value and collectibles that are priced based on demand and supply:


You may disagree with my categorization, and there are shades of gray, where an investment can be in more than one grouping. Gold, for instance, is both a collectible of long standing and a commodity that has specific uses, but the former dominates the latter, when it comes to pricing. In the same vein, crypto has a diverse array of players, with a few meeting the asset test and some (like ethereum) having commodity features. The contrast between the different investment classes also allows for a contrast between investing, where you buy (sell) an investment if it is under (over) valued, and trading, where you buy (sell) an investment if you expect its price to go up (down). The former is a choice, though not a requirement, with an asset (stocks, bonds or private businesses), though there may be others who still trade that asset. With currencies and collectibles, you can only trade, making judgments on price direction, which, in turn, requires assessments of mood and momentum, rather than fundamentals. 
    With bitcoin, this classification allows us to cut through the many distractions that pop up during discussions of its pricing level, since it can be framed either as a currency or a collectible, and thus only priced, not valued. Seventeen years into its existence, Bitcoin has struggled on the currency front, and while there are pockets where it has gained acceptance, its design makes it inefficient and its volatility has impeded its adoption as a medium of exchange. As a collectible, Bitcoin starts with the advantage of scarcity, restricted as it is to 21 million units, but it has not quite measured up, at least so far, when it comes to holding its value (or increasing it) when financial assets are in meltdown mode. In every crisis since 2008, Bitcoin has behaved more like risky stock, falling far more than the average stock, when stocks are down, and rising more, when they recover. I noted this in my posts looking at the performance of investments in both the first quarter of 2020, when COVID laid waste to markets, and in 2022, when inflation ravaged stock and bond markets. That said, it is still early in its life, and it is entirely possible that it may change its behavior as it matures and draws in a wider investor base. The bottom line is that discussions of whether Bitcoin is cheap or expensive are often pointless and sometimes frustrating, since it depends almost entirely on your perspective on how the demand for Bitcoin will shift over time. If you believe that its appeal will fade, and that it will be displaced by other collectibles, perhaps even in the crypto space, you will be in the short selling camp. If you are convinced that its appeal will not just endure but also reach fresh segments of the market, you are on solid ground in assuming that its price will continue to rise. It behooves both groups to admit that neither has a monopoly on the truth, and this is a disagreement about trading and not an argument about fundamentals.

The MicroStrategy Story

    It is undeniable that one company, MicroStrategy, has done more to advance the corporate holding of Bitcoin than any other, and that has come from four factors;

  1. A stock market winner: The company's stock price has surged over the last decade, making it one of the best performing stocks on the US exchanges:
     It is worth noting that almost all of the outperformance has occurred in this decade, with the winnings concentrated into the last two years. 
  2. With the rise (increasingly) tied to Bitcoin: Almost all of MicroStrategy’s outperformance has come from its holdings of bitcoin, and not come from improvements in business operations. That comes through in the graph below, where I look at the prices of MicroStrategy and Bitcoin since 2014:

     
     Note that MicroStrategy’s stock price has gone from being slightly negatively correlated with Bitcoin’s price between 2014-2018 to tracking Bitcoin in more recent years.
  3. And disconnected from operations: In 2014, MicroStrategy was viewed and priced as a software/services tech company, albeit a small one with promise. In the last decade, its operating numbers have stagnated, with both revenues and gross profits declining, but during the same period, its enterprise value has soared from $1 billion in 2014 to more than more than $100 billion in July 2025:

    It is clear now that anyone investing in MicroStrategy at its current market cap (>$100 billion) is making a bitcoin play.
  4. With a high-profile "bitcoin evangelist" as CEO:  MicroStrategy’s CEO, Michael Saylor, has been a vocal and highly visible promoter of bitcoin, and has converted many of his shareholders into fellow-evangelists and convinced at least some of them that he is prescient in detecting price movements. In recent years, he has been public in his plans to issue increasing amounts of stock and using the proceeds to buy more bitcoin.
In sum, MicroStrategy is now less a software company and more a Bitcoin SPAC or closed-end fund, where investors are trusting Saylor to make the right trading judgments on when to buy (and sell) bitcoin, and hoping to benefit from the profits. 

The “Put your cash in bitcoin” movement

     For investors in other publicly traded companies that have struggled delivering value in their operating businesses, MicroStrategy’s success with its bitcoin holdings seems to indicate a lost opportunity, and one that can be remedied by jumping on the bandwagon now. In recent months, even high profile companies, like Microsoft, have seen shareholder proposals pushing them to abandon their conventional practice of holding cash in liquid and close-to-riskless investments and buying Bitcoin instead. Microsoft’s shareholders soundly rejected the proposal, and I will start by arguing that they were right, and that for most companies, investing cash in bitcoin does not make sense, but in the second part, I will carve out the exceptions to this rule.

The General Principle: No to Bitcoin

    As a general rule, I think it is not only a bad idea for most companies to invest their cash in bitcoin, but I would go further and also argue that they should banned from doing so. Let me hasten to add that I would make this assertion even if I was bullish on Bitcoin, and my argument would apply just as strongly to companies considering moving their cash into gold, Picassos or sports franchises, for five reasons:

  1. Bitcoin does not meet the cash motives: Earlier in this post, I noted the reasons why a company  holds cash, and, in particular, as a shock absorber, steadying a firm through bad times. Replacing low-volatility cash with high-volatility bitcoin would undercut this objective, analogous to replacing your shock absorbers with pogo sticks. In fact, given the history of moving with stock prices, the value of bitcoin on a company's balance sheet will dip at exactly the times where you would need it most for stability. The argument that bitcoin would have made a lot higher returns for companies than holding cash is a non-starter, since companies should hold cash for safety.
  2. Bitcoin can step on your operating business narrative: I have long argued that successful businesses are built around narratives that incorporate their competitive advantages. When companies that are in good businesses put their cash in bitcoin, they risk muddying the waters on two fronts. First, it creates confusion about why a company with a solid business narrative from which it can derive value would seek to make money on a side game. Second, the ebbs and flows of bitcoin can affect financial statements, making it more difficult to connect operating results to story lines. 
  3. Managers as traders? When companies are given the license to move their cash into bitcoin or other non-operating investments, you are trusting managers to get the timing right, in terms of when to buy and sell these investments. That trust is misplaced, since top managers (CEOs and CFOs) are for the most part terrible traders, often buying at the market highs and selling at lows.
  4. Leave it to shareholders: Even if you are unconvinced by the first three reasons, and you are a bitcoin advocate or enthusiast, you will be better served pushing companies that you are a shareholder in, to return their cash to you, to invest in bitcoin, gold or any other investment at your chosen time. Put simply, if you believe that Bitcoin is the place to put your money, why would you trust corporate managers to do it for you?
  5. License for abuse: I am a skeptic when it comes to corporate governance, believing that managerial interests are often at odds with what's good for shareholders. Giving managers the permission to trade crypto tokens, bitcoin or other collectibles can open the door for self dealing and worse. 
While I am a fan of letting shareholders determine the limits on what managers can or cannot do, I believe that the SEC (and other stock market regulators around the world) may need to become more explicit in their rules on what companies can (and cannot) do with cash.

The Carveouts

    I do believe that there are cases when you, as a shareholder, may be at peace with the company not only investing cash in bitcoin, but doing so actively and aggressively. Here are four of my carveouts to the general rule on bitcoin:

  1. The Bitcoin Savant: In my earlier description of MicroStrategy, I argued that shareholders in MicroStrategy have not only gained immensely from its bitcoin holdings, but also trust Michael Saylor to trade bitcoin for them. In short, the perception, rightly or wrongly, is that Saylor is a bitcoin savant, understanding the mood and momentum swings better than the rest of us. Generalizing, if a company has a leader (usually a CEO or CFO) who is viewed as someone who is good at gauging bitcoin price direction, it is possible that shareholders in the company may be willing to grant him or her the license to trade bitcoin on their behalf.  This is, of course, not unique to bitcoin, and you can argue that investors in Berkshire Hathaway have paid a premium for its stock, and allowed it leeway to hold and deploy immense amounts of cash because they trusted Warren Buffett to make the right investment judgments. 
  2. The Bitcoin Business: For some companies, holding bitcoin may be part and parcel of their business operations, less a substitute for cash and more akin to inventory. PayPal and Coinbase, both of which hold large amounts of bitcoin, would fall into this carveout, since both companies have business that requires that holding.
  3. The Bitcoin Escape Artist: As some of you may be aware, I noted that Mercado Libre, a Latin American online retail firm, is on my buy list, and it is a company with a fairly substantial bitcoin holding. While part of that holding may relate to the operating needs of their fintech business, it is worth noting that Mercado Libre is an Argentine company, and the Argentine peso has been a perilous currency to hold on to, making bitcoin a viable option for cash holdings. Generalizing, companies in countries with failed currencies may conclude that holding their cash in bitcoin is less risky than holding it in the fiat currencies of the locations they operate in.
  4. The Bitcoin Meme: There is a final grouping of companies that I would put in the meme stock category, with AMC and Gamestop heading that list. These companies have operating business models that have broken down or have declining value, but they have become, by design or through accident, trading plays, where the price bears no resemblance to operating fundamentals and is instead driven by mood and momentum. If that is the case, it may make sense for these companies to throw in the towel on operating businesses entirely and instead make themselves even more into trading vehicles by moving into bitcoin, with the increased volatility adding to their "meme" allure.

Even with these exceptions, though, I think that you need guardrails before signing off on opening the door to letting companies hold bitcoin.

  1. Shareholder buy-in: If you are a publicly traded company considering investing some or much of the company's cash in bitcoin, it behooves you to get shareholder approval for that move, since it is shareholder cash that is being deployed. 
  2. Transparency about Bitcoin transactions/holdings: Once a company invests in bitcoin, it is imperative that there be full and clear disclosure not only on those holdings but also on trading (buying and selling) that occurs. After all, if it is a company's claim that it can time its bitcoin trades better than the average investor, it should reveal the prices at which it bought and sold its bitcoin. 
  3. Clear mark-to-market rules: If a company invests its cash in bitcoin, I will assume that the value of that bitcoin will be volatile, and accounting rules have to clearly specify how that bitcoin gets marked to market, and where the profits and losses from that marking to market will show up in the financial statements. 
As bitcoin prices rise to all time highs, there is the danger that regulators and rule-writers will be lax in their rule-writing, opening the door to corporate scandals in the future.

Cui Bono?

    Bitcoin advocates have been aggressively pushing both institutional investors and companies to include Bitcoin in their investment choices, and it is true that at least first sight, they will benefit from that inclusion. Expanding the demand for bitcoin, an investment with a fixed supply, will drive the price upwards, and existing bitcoin holders will benefit. In fact, much of the rise of bitcoin since the Trump election in November 2024 can be attributed to the perception that this administration will ease the way for companies and investors to join in the crypto bonanza.

    For bitcoin holders, increasing institutional and corporate buy-in to bitcoin may seem like an unmixed blessing, but there will be costs that, in the long run, may lead at least some of them to regret this push:

  1. Different investor base: Drawing in institutional investors and companies into the bitcoin market will not only change its characteristics, but put traders who may know how to play the market now at a disadvantage, as it shifts dynamics.
  2. Here today, gone tomorrow? Bitcoin may be in vogue now, but what will the consequences be if it halves in price over the next six months? Institutions and companies are notoriously ”sheep like” in their behavior, and what is in vogue today may be abandoned tomorrow. If you believe that bitcoin is volatile now, adding these investors to the mix will put that volatility on steroids.
  3. Change asset characteristics: Every investment class that has been securitized and brought into institutional investing has started behaving like a financial asset, moving more with stocks and bonds than it has historically. This happened with real estate in the 1980s and 1990s, with mortgage backed securities and other tradable versions of real estate, making it far more correlated with stock and bonds, and less of a stand alone asset. 
If the end game for bitcoin is to make it millennial gold, an alternative or worthy add-on to financial assets, the better course would be steer away from establishment buy-in and build it up with an alternative investor base, driven by different forces and motives than stock and bond markets. 

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Wednesday, March 5, 2025

Data Update 9 for 2025: Dividends and Buybacks - Inertia and Me-tooism!

In my ninth (and last) data post for 2025, I look at cash returned by businesses across the world, looking at both the magnitude and the form of that return. I start with a framework for thinking about how much cash a business can return to its owners, and then argue that, in the real world, this decision is skewed by inertia and me-tooism. I also look at a clear and discernible shift away from dividends to stock buybacks, especially in the US, and examine both good and bad reasons for this shift. After reporting on the total cash returned during the year, by public companies, in the form of dividends and buybacks, I scale the cash returned to earnings (payout ratios) and to market cap (yield) and present the cross sectional distribution of both statistics across global companies.

The Cash Return Decision
    The decision of whether to return cash, and how much to return, should, at least in principle, be the simplest of the three corporate finance decisions, since it does not involve the estimation uncertainties that go with investment decisions and the angst of trading of tax benefits against default risk implicit in financing decisions. In practice, though, there is probably more dysfunctionality in the cash return decision, than the other two, partly driven by deeply held, and often misguided views, of what returning cash to shareholders does or does not do to a business, and partly by the psychology that returning cash to shareholders is an admission that a company's growth days are numbered. In this section, I will start with a utopian vision, where I examine how cash return decisions should play out in a business and follow up with the reality, where bad dividend/cash return decisions can drive a business over a cliff. 

The Utopian Version
    If, as I asserted in an earlier post, equity investors have a claim the cash flows left over after all needs (from taxes to debt payments to reinvestment needs) are met, dividends should represent the end effect of all of those choices. In fact, in the utopian world where dividends are residual cash flows, here is the sequence you should expect to see at businesses:

In a residual dividend version of the world, companies will start with their cash flows from operations, supplement them with the debt that they think is right for them, invest that cash in good projects and the cash that is left over after all these needs have been met is available for cash return. Some of that cash will be held back in the company as a cash balance, but the balance can be returned either as dividends or in buybacks. If companies following this sequence to determine, here are the implications:
  • The cash returned should not only vary from year to year, with more (less) cash available for return in good (bad) years), but also across firms, as firms that struggle on profitability or have large reinvestment needs might find that not only do they not have any cash to return, but that they might have to raise fresh capital from equity investors to keep going. 
  • It also follows that the investment, financing, and dividend decisions, at most firms, are interconnected, since for any given set of investments, borrowing more money will free up more cash flows to return to shareholders, and for any given financing, investing more back into the business will leave less in returnable cash flows. 
    Seen through this structure, you can compute potential dividends simply by looking for each of the cash flow elements along the way, starting with an add back of depreciation and non-cash charges to net income, and then netting out investment needs (capital expenditures, working capital, acquisitions) as well as cash flow from debt (new debt) and to debt (principal repayments). 

While this measure of potential dividend has a fanciful name (free cash flow to equity), it is not only just a measure of cash left in the till at the end of the year, after all cash needs have been met, but one that is easy to compute, since every items on the list above should be in the statement of cash flows.
    As with almost every other aspect of corporate finance, a company's capacity to return cash, i.e., pay potential dividends will vary as it moves through the corporate life cycle, and the graph below traces the path:

There are no surprises here, but it does illustrate how a business transitions from being a young company with negative free cash flows to equity (and thus dependent on equity issuances) to stay alive to one that has the capacity to start returning cash as it moves through the growth cycle before becoming a cash cow in maturity.

The Dysfunctional Version
    In practice, though, there is no other aspect of corporate finance that is more dysfunctional than the cash return or dividend decision, partly because the latter (dividends) has acquired characteristics that get in the way of adopting a rational policy. In the early years of equity markets, in the late 1800s,  companies wooed investors who were used to investing in bonds with fixed coupons, by promising them predictable dividends as an alternative to the coupons. That practice has become embedded into companies, and dividends continue to be sticky, as can be seen by the number of companies that do not change dividends each year in the graph below:

While this graph is only of US companies, companies around the world have adopted variants of this sticky dividend policy, with the stickiness in absolute dividends (per share) in much of the world, and in payout ratios in Latin America. Put simply, at most companies, dividends this year will be equal to dividends last year, and if there is a change, it is more likely to be an increase than a decrease.
    This stickiness in dividends has created several consequences for firms. First, firms are cautious in initiating dividends, doing so only when they feel secure in their capacity to keep generate earnings. Second, since the punishment for deviating from stickiness is far worse, when you cut dividends, far more firms increase dividends than decrease them. Finally, there are companies that start paying sizable dividends, find their businesses deteriorate under them and cannot bring themselves to cut dividends. For these firms, dividends become the driving force, determining financing and investment decisions, rather than being determined by them.
This is, of course, dangerous to firm health, but given a choice between the pain of announcing a dividend suspension (or cut) and being punished by the market and covering up operating problems by continuing to pay dividends, many managers choose the latter, laying th e pathway to dividend madness.

Dividends versus Buybacks

     As for the choice of how to return that cash, i.e., whether to pay dividends or buy back stock, the basics are simple. Both actions (dividends and buybacks) have exactly the same effect on a company’s business picture, reducing the cash held by the business and the equity (book and market) in the business. It is true that the investors who receive these cash flows may face different tax consequences and that while neither action can create value, buybacks have the potential to transfer wealth from one group of shareholders (either the ones that sell back or the ones who hold on) to the other, if the buyback price is set too low or too high.    

    It is undeniable that companies, especially in the United States, have shifted away from a policy of returning cash almost entirely in dividends until the early 1980s to one where the bulk of the cash is returned in buybacks. In the chart below, I show this shift by looking at the aggregated dividends and buybacks across S&P 500 companies from the mid-1980s to 2024:




While there are a number of reasons that you can point to for this shift, including tax benefits to investors, the rise of management options and shifting tastes among institutional investors, the primary reason, in my view, is that sticky dividends have outlived their usefulness, in a business age, where fewer and fewer companies feel secure about their earning power. Buybacks, in effect, are flexible dividends, since companies, when faced with headwinds, quickly reduce or cancel buybacks, while continuing to pay dividends: In the table below, I look at the differences between dividends and buybacks:

If earnings variability and unpredictability explains the shifting away from dividends, it stands to reason that this will not just be a US phenomenon, and that you will see buybacks increase across the world. In the next section, we will see if this is happening.

    There are so many misconceptions about buybacks that I did write a piece that looks in detail at those reasons. I do want to reemphasize one of the delusions that both buyback supporters and opponents use, i.e., that buybacks create or destroy value. Thus, buyback supporters argue that a company that is buying back its own shares at a price lower than its underlying value, is effectively taking an investment with a positive net present value, and is thus creating value. That is not true, since that action just transfers value from shareholders who sell back (at the too low a price) to the shareholders who hold on to their shares. Similarly, buyback opponents note that many companies buy back their shares, when their stock prices hit new highs, and thus risk paying too high a price, relative to value, thus destroying value. This too is false, since paying too much for shares also is a wealth transfer, this time from those who remain shareholders in the firm to those who sell back their shares. 

Cash Return in 2024

    Given the push and pull between dividends as a residual cash flow, and the dysfunctional factors that cause companies to deviate from this end game, it is worth examining how much companies did return to their shareholders in 2024, across sectors and regions, to see which forces wins out.

Cash Return in 2024

    Let's start with the headline numbers. In 2024, companies across the globe returned $4.09 trillion in cash to their shareholders, with $2.56 trillion in dividends and $1.53 trillion taking the form of stock buybacks. If you are wondering how the market can withstand this much cash being withdrawn, it is worth emphasizing an obvious, but oft overlooked fact, which is that the bulk of this cash found its way back into the market, albeit into other companies. In fact, a healthy market is built on cash being returned by some businesses (older, lower growth) and being plowed back into growth businesses that need that capital.

    That lead in should be considered when you look at cash returned by companies, broken down by sector, in the table below, with the numbers reported both in US dollars and scaled to the earnings at these companies:

To make the assessment, I first classified firms into money making and money losing, and aggregated the dividends and buybacks for each group, within each sector.  Not surprisingly, the bulk of the cash bering returned is from money making firms, but the percentages of firms that are money making does vary widely across sectors. Utilities and financials have the highest percentage of money makers on the list, and financial service firms were the largest dividend payers, paying $620.3 billion in dividends in 2024, followed by energy ($346.2 billion) and industrial ($305.3 billion). Scaled to net income, dividend payout ratios were highest in the energy sector and technology companies had the lowest payout ratios. Technology companies, with $280.4 billion, led the sectors in buybacks, and almost 58% of the cash returned at money making companies in the sector took that form. 

   Breaking down global companies by region gives us a measure of variation on cash return across the world, both in magnitude and in the type of cash return:


It should come as no surprise that the United States accounted for a large segment (more than $1.5 trillion) of cash returned by all companies, driven partly by a mature economy and partly by a more activist investor base, and that a preponderance of this cash (almost 60%) takes the form of buybacks. Indian companies return the lowest percentage (31.1%) of their earnings as cash to shareholders, with the benign explanation being that they are reinvesting for growth and the not-so-benign reason being poor corporate governance. After all, in publicly traded companies, managers have the discretion to decide how much cash to return to shareholders, and in the absence of shareholder pressure, they, not surprisingly, hold on to cash, even if they do not have no need for it. It is also interesting that buybacks seems to be making inroads in other paths of the world, with even Chinese companies joining the party.

FCFE and Cash Return

    While it is conventional practice to scale dividends to net income, to arrive at payout ratios, we did note, in the earlier section, that you can compute potential dividends from financial statements, Here again, I will start with the headline numbers again. In 2024, companies around the world collectively generated $1.66 trillion in free cash flows to equity:

As you can see in the figure, companies started with net income of $6,324 billion, reinvested $4,582 billion in capital expenditures and debt repayments exceeded debt issuances by $90 billion to arrive at the free cash flow to equity of $1.66 trillion. That said, companies managed to pay out $2,555 billion in dividends and bought back $1,525 billion in stock, a total cash return of almost $4.1 trillion.

    As the aggregate numbers indicate, there are many companies with cash return that does not sync with potential dividends or earnings. In the picture below, we highlight four groups of companies, with the first two focused on dividends, relative to earnings, and the other two structured around cash returned relative to free cash flows to equity, where we look at mismatches.


Let's start with the net income/dividend match up. Across every region of the world, 17.5% of money losing companies continue to pay dividends, just as 31% of money-making companies choose not to pay dividends. Using the free cash flows to equity to divide companies, 38% of companies with positive FCFE choose not to return any cash to their shareholder while 48% of firms with negative FCFE continue to pay dividends. While all of these firms claim to have good reasons for their choices, and I have listed some of them, dividend dysfunction is alive and well in the data.

    I argued earlier in this post that cash return policy varies as companies go through the life cycle, and to see if that holds, we broke down global companies into deciles, based upon corporate age, from youngest to oldest, and looked at the prevalence of dividends and buybacks in each group:

As you can see, a far higher percent of the youngest companies are money-losing and have negative FCFE, and it is thus not surprising that they have the lowest percentage of firms that pay dividends or buy back stock. As companies age, the likelihood of positive earnings and cash flows increases, as does the likelihood of dividend payments and stock buybacks.

Conclusion
    While dividends are often described as residual cash flows, they have evolved over time to take on a more weighty meaning, and many companies have adopted dividend policies that are at odds with their capacity to return cash. There are two forces that feed this dividend dysfunction. The first is inertia, where once a company initiates a dividend policy, it is reluctant to back away from it, even though circumstances change. The second is me-tooism, where companies adopt cash return policies to match  their peer groups, paying dividends because other companies are also paying dividends, or buying back stock for the same reasons. These factors explain so much of what we see in companies and markets, but they are particularly effective in explaining the current cash return policies of companies.

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Data Links
  1. Dividend fundamentals, by industry (US, Global, Emerging Markets, Europe, Japan, India, China)
  2. Cash return and FCFE, by industry (US, Global, Emerging Markets, Europe, Japan, India, China)